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ABSTRACT
CARE WORK IN CHILE’S SEGREGATED CITIES
SEPTEMBER 2021
MANUEL GARCIA, B.A., UNIVERSIDAD DE CHILE
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor M.V. Lee Badgett
This project combines diverse theoretical and methodological tools to examine the
relationship between space and care work in Chile. The chapters are stand-alone articles
that come together to tell a single story. The social production of urban space has
marginalized thousands of female caregivers from the labor market as Chile’s care
system unravels. I argue that community caregiving could simultaneously improve the
conditions of caregivers and dependents.
Chapter 1 examines the role of residential segregation in reproducing Chile’s
meager female labor market participation rates. I use spatial and econometric analysis
to show that the social forces that segregate Santiago create a landscape that penalizes
the labor market participation of individuals with mobility constraints. Unpaid care is
especially restrictive to mobility. Hence, caregivers residing in economically marginalized
regions are significantly less likely to participate in the labor market. Thanks to the
gendering of care, female caregivers’ participation is the most negatively affected by the
city’s residential configuration.
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In Chapter 2, I use political economy analysis to examine the capability of the
Chilean system to meet the growing demand for adult care in a rapidly aging population.
Moreover, the care system continues to rely excessively on unpaid family members (i.e.,
women) to care for adult dependents. However, Chile’s demographic transition has also
led to transformations in dependents’ family structures. With the help of econometric
analysis, I show that dependents living in households where the patriarchal division of
labor is unfeasible are significantly less likely to receive assistance. Additionally, using
Machine Learning methods, I demonstrate that dependents are increasingly living in
these types of households.
Chapter 3 explores the possibility of replacing the family as the primary space of
adult care for the community. It uses theoretical tools to analyze the economic
implications of a state-funded program hiring caregivers to assist adult dependents in
their communities. Since adult dependency rates are higher in economically
marginalized communities, the program would disproportionately benefit the urban
poor, especially women. Additionally, the program would boost aggregate demand and
aggregate supply, leading to real economic growth. A crucial factor determining the
program’s success is trust in community care.
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INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT
This dissertation is the product of four years of thinking about space and work. A project
combining various analytical and methodological frameworks in stand-alone articles
which, together, tell a single story. The narrative illustrates that the social production of
space is fundamental in the accumulation of gender and economic inequalities.
Therefore, it should play a central role in overcoming them.
The project is centered in Chile. A country where profound economic inequality
has solidified in residentially segregated cities (Garreton et al., 2020). This urban
configuration entails remarkably different experiences for the poor and the rich, beyond
their distinct economic capabilities. In the pages that follow, I argue that this landscape
thoroughly conditions the experience of providing and receiving care.
Care is an essential activity. Without it, any social order is unfeasible. However,
unlike other essential activities, most care work goes unpaid. Centuries of patriarchal
conditioning have naturalized us into relying on women’s free supply of care. Moreover,
since care is a public good, its benefits are not accrued by those who bear the costs of
producing it (Folbre, 2021). Patriarchal systems, however, do not operate in a void. They
interact with other social and spatial structures producing differences in the experience
of caregiving. Therefore, not all women experience caregiving in the same way.
The first article in this project, “Residential segregation and female labor market
participation,” is a testament to these differences. The paper underscores the economic
implications of caring in different neighborhoods of Santiago. The concentration of
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employment opportunities in the more affluent regions of town characterizes the city.
Mobility, thus, is an asset for those living in lower-income peripheral neighborhoods.
Care entails coupling constraints to mobility (Hagerstrand, 1970; Kwan et al.,
2000). Caring takes place somewhere, at some time, with someone. The restrictive
nature of coupling constraints severely penalizes caregivers’ urban mobility. Hence, as
the paper shows, female caregivers in peripheral communities are significantly less likely
to participate in the labor market than any other social group.
Using spatial and econometric analysis, I show that the interaction between the
patriarchal system and economic segregation fuels two types of inequality. On the one
hand, it enforces gender inequalities within lower-income peripheral households. On
the other, it deepens economic inequalities between those living in wealthier regions of
the city and the urban poor.
My second paper, “The limits to care,” examines the conditions of those who need
care. Specifically, I use political economy analysis to evaluate the capability of the
Chilean care system to meet the growing demand for adult care. The article finds that
the system’s over-reliance on unpaid female provision severely limits its ability to supply
care. Without structural reform, an adult care crisis looms on the horizon.
Space is integral to this paper’s analytical framework. Spatial configurations are
not only concrete, as is the case of cities, but also abstract and imagined. For instance,
the division of labor, economics most fundamental category, is limited by abstract
space. Its operation becomes difficult outside certain imagined boundaries (e.g., the
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market, the nation, the household). Hence, when the space for the division of care labor
is tight or shrinking, it is unlikely for the system to increase its care supply.
Currently, the system relies almost exclusively on a patriarchal division of labor
limited by the family space. Using econometric analysis, I show that dependents living in
households where the patriarchal division of labor is severely limited are far less likely to
receive any assistance. Moreover, with the help of Machine Learning prediction
methods, I show that dependents are increasingly living in these households. This
pattern is likely to continue as population aging drives growing dependency rates.
This project’s first and second papers underscore the role of space in the
production of social afflictions. The third one, “An economic case for community care
aides,” ventures into the theoretical to highlight space as part of the antidote for these
afflictions. Adult dependency rates are higher in lower-income neighborhoods. Hence,
there is a spatial correspondence between low female labor market participation rates
and growing care needs. In this context, I propose the implementation of a Community
Care Aides (CCA) program.
CCAs are caregivers hired and paid by the state to provide care for adult
dependents in their communities. The CCA stimulates female labor participation
through two channels. First of all, it allows lower-income women to outsource care to a
qualified network of caregivers, reducing the coupling constraints of care. Secondly, if
they choose to continue caring, the program creates local job opportunities that are not
far from home.
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Since it would disproportionately benefit lower-income women, the CCA program
would reduce inequalities even as it boosts economic growth. Therefore, the program is
not only a good strategy for increasing the coverage and quality of adult care. Its
economic implications entail that CCAs can contribute to the inclusive development of
the Chilean economy

4

CHAPTER 1
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION AND FEMALE LABOR MARKET PARTICIPATION
THE CASE OF SANTIAGO DE CHILE

I.

Introduction

Every weekend, Gabriela walks Santa Rosa avenue to sell windows. She looks for homes
displaying cracked or missing windows to offer her services. Her clients are often
surprised by this 61-year-old Window Repair Woman. “People tell me that this is a
man’s job”—she says. Marcela, Gabriela’s 31-year-old daughter who has a cognitive
disability, walks beside her. Marcela’s care is solely Gabriela’s responsibility, so she has
always had to bring her daughter along. “We can only work on spacious avenues;
otherwise, Marcela gets lost”—Gabriela tells me. Gabriela and Marcela live in La
Pintana, Santiago’s poorest municipal jurisdiction. Given Marcela’s condition, Gabriela
has had to find ways to provide for her family without moving too far away from home.
The challenge, however, is that there are very few jobs in La Pintana. Hence, windowrepair.1
Gabriela’s experience illustrates the struggle of many low-income caregivers in
Santiago, Chile’s capital city. The burden of balancing paid and unpaid activities is
compounded by an urban environment that agglomerates employment opportunities

1

I interviewed Gabriela in July of 2019.
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far from their homes. This article analyzes the effects of residential segregation on
Santiago’s exceptionally low female labor market participation by examining the joint
constraints of unpaid caregiving and distance to work.
Chile ranks second to last in female labor market participation among South
American countries (Serrano et al. 2019). Within the poorest 20% of population, less
than a third of working-age women provided labor for pay and nearly half of nonparticipants are unable to enter the labor market due to unpaid domestic and care labor
responsibilities. 2 The different explanations for this phenomenon, as outlined in Section
II, have failed to account for residential segregation’s role. This is a serious oversight
considering that over 90% of Chileans live in economically segregated cities (Garreton et
al. 2020).
I address this oversight by presenting theoretical and empirical evidence on how
residential segregation disproportionately affected the labor market participation of less
educated female caregivers. In doing so, I underscore the intersectional nature of
Santiago’s segregation, which thus far has been mostly studied from an economic lens
(Sabatini and Brain 2008; Garreton 2017).
Section III introduces our theoretical framework. The sexual division of unpaid
care labor entails mobility constraints which limit women’s ability to travel long
distances for employment. Moreover, a public transportation system which is not
designed for the balancing paid and unpaid responsibilities complicates the logistics for

2

These values were calculated using the 2017 CASEN. The survey can be found at
http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/encuesta-casen-2017
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combining these activities (Hanson and Pratt 1995, Kwan 2000, Loukaitou-Sideris 2016).
Under these conditions, local markets are a more viable option for female labor market
participation. The concentration of employment opportunities in wealthy
neighborhoods, hence, presents an unfavorable landscape for low income caregivers’
participation. In economic geography, this phenomenon is known as a spatial mismatch
(Kain 1968; Fernandez and Su 2004; Gobillion et al. 2007).
Sections IV through VI compose the empirical analysis of spatial mismatch effects
over less educated women’s labor market participation. Section IV contextualizes
Santiago’s residential sorting, highlighting the events that led to the location of the
urban poor in regions distant from the city’s economic center. Section V introduces the
primary dataset for analysis, the variables of interests, and some methodological issues
regarding the quantitative analysis of spatial variables.
Our primary dataset is the 2012 Origin Destination Survey (ODS). This survey
contains geo-referenced information for over 60,000 individuals’ households and more
than 23,000 employment locations for the greater Santiago region allowing us te
measure local job density. Job density, our independent variable of interest, is defined as
the ratio of employment opportunities to working-age residents in a given locality
(Hellerstein et al. 2008). This variable will vary according to different labor market
assumptions and, for robustness purposes, this article considers three different models.
Additionally, Section V shows job density’s spatial distribution in Santiago, underscoring
the geographical matching of high-density regions with high income and high schooling
neighborhoods.

7

Section VI culminates the empirical assessment through the econometric
analysis of spatial mismatch effects. Considering possible self-selection problems, I show
that less educated female caregivers are unlikely to sort themselves into high density
regions. As a result, I restrict the primary analysis to this subpopulation. Avoiding selfselection problems allows us to perform OLS (with municipal fixed effects) analysis. The
wide use of this technique makes these findings transparent and accessible. As a
secondary analysis, spatial mismatch effects are calculated for other subpopulations,
including non-caregivers and more educated individuals. Moreover, I analyze if spatial
mismatch affects accessing formal and full-time employment.
My findings show that less educated female caregivers’ participation in the labor
market is significantly lowered in regions with low job density. No other subpopulation
is affected by residential segregation in this manner. Therefore, I conclude that the
residential sorting of the city intensifies gender inequalities within less educated
household even as it reproduces economic inequalities between low- and high-income
regions of the city. Section VII discusses the implications of our main findings.

II.

Chile’s low female labor market participation in the literature

Chile’s low female labor market participation has received an important deal of
scholarly attention. During the first decade of the 2000s, cultural explanations
dominated this discussion. Since 2010, however, more structural arguments have
emerged.
8

Paredes (2003) finds that significant increases in female labor market participation
rates have only occurred in long durations of high-economic growth. Since prolonged
periods of economic growth are sporadic, the author predicts that it is unlikely to
observe sustained growth’s in participation. Larrañaga (2006) offers an idiosyncratic
reason for low participation rates. He argues that decreasing fertility and marriage rates
during the 1990s prompted an increase in female participation among middle- and highincome families over the same time period. Ferrada and Zarzoza (2010) add that age is a
determining factor. This line of argumentation holds that younger women are more
likely to participate in the labor market due to cultural changes regarding women’s
relationship to paid work. Finally, Contreras and Plaza (2010) argue that patriarchal
values are more prevalent among low-income families, contributing to the low
participation rate among women in these households.
Structural explanations regarding the uneven distribution of care responsibilities
have emerged in the last decade (Encina and Martinez 2009; Contreras et al. 2012;
Martinez and Perticara 2017). Contreras and his co-authors (2012) find that access to
private care services has increased women’s labor supply in the middle and upper levels
of the income distribution. Martinez and Perticara (2017), furthermore, carried out a
randomized control trial evaluating an after-school program. They found that the
program increased female participation and employment by 7% and 5%, respectively.
Although these programs are not available to most of the Chilean population, this
research underscores how the temporal constraints of unpaid care work penalize female
labor supply.
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The spatial constraints to participation have received far less attention. Two
undertakings have made original contributions in this regard. Puga and Soto (2018)
argued that the segmented nature of social space plays a significant role in determining
low-income and less educated women's participation. In particular, they show that
unequal access to employment information networks (social capital) has reinforced the
gap in participation rates between women in different economic classes. Asahi (2015),
on the other hand, found that improvements to Santiago’s public transportation
network presented more favorable conditions for less educated women’s participation.
However, none of these works consider the spatial constraints emerging from
residential segregation for women’s participation in the labor market.

III.

Spatial mismatch and gender

Residential segregation is the spatial clustering of a subpopulation sharing one or more
personal attributes. Race, class, ethnicity, or a combination of these categories are often
identified as the basis of this phenomenon (Davis 2007; Rothstein 2017). Therefore,
scholars have analyzed the effects of segregation on labor market outcomes from the
perspective of these categories (Kain 1968; Wilson 1997; Zenou 2013).
Gender inequalities emerging from segregation have received far less attention.
Gender, after all, is rarely the basis of segregation. However, this does not mean that
segregation is not a gendered experience. People experience class, race, and ethnicity in
distinctive ways. The mutual constitution of social categories entails that the re10

articulation of one category will result in the reconfiguration of the rest. Hence, if
segregation is a racial/class/ethnic phenomenon, it must also be a gendered one.
This section presents the theoretical mechanisms by which segregation
conditions labor market access across class and gender. 3 In a nutshell, I argue that
residential segregation fragments the urban landscape across education levels. Less
educated workers are often located in regions where employment opportunities are
scant, generating a spatial mismatch between their households and job-places.
Moreover, the geographical representations of the patriarchal division of labor and
gender norms accentuate the spatial mismatch penalties for less educated female
workers, especially caregivers, limiting their access to labor markets.

a. The spatial mismatch hypothesis

The spatial mismatch hypothesis connects residential segregation to poor labor market
outcomes. Its original proposition argued that segregation imposes spatial barriers to
employment opportunities in the form of higher job-search costs. Additionally, by
placing similarly educated workers in close proximity to each other, segregation

The focus on class rather than in race is due to the nature of the case study analyzed in subsequent
sections. Santiago’s residential segregation, unlike most cities in the United States, has been primarily
defined across economic rather than racial attributes (Sabatini 2000; Hidalgo 2007; Agostini et al. 2016;
Garreton 2017).

3
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intensifies competition for local employment (Kain 1968; Fernandez and Su 2004;
Gobillion et al. 2007). 4
The hypothesis emphasizes the role of distance to work and mobility in
mediating the relationship between segregation and labor market outcomes. Highly
mobile workers can mitigate spatial mismatch effects. However, not all individuals share
similar capacities for mobility. Mobility is informed by our position within multiple social
hierarchies, including gender.

b. Engendering the spatial mismatch hypothesis

Female labor market participation has increased significantly over the last decades.
However, the masculinization of unpaid activities has proceeded at a much slower pace
(Folbre 2021). The persistence of the patriarchal division of labor bears substantial
consequences for women’s mobility. Unpaid activities are performed in a given place
and at a particular time. Cooking meals, housework, and grocery shopping are all
activities that, for the most part, cannot be performed from the job place. Moreover,
activities like setting up the table for lunch, picking up the children from school, or going

4

The logic behind commuting and search costs effects is straightforward. People take into consideration
the monetary cost of traveling to work; if this is too high, the net benefits from employment are lower
(Zenou 2009). The spatial barriers to information have also been addressed through the significance of
social networks for facilitating employment opportunities. The social composition of these networks is
mediated by space. One application of this notion contends that segregated residents tend to have
‘strong-ties’ networks (close relations), with very few weak nodes (acquaintances). In close relations
networks, information on job opportunities may be quickly flooded by the many close members of the
network (Zenou 2013).
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to PTA meetings occur at a particular location and at a specific time. These unpaid tasks
penalize women’s participation in labor markets as they are often incompatible with the
workplace and the working-day. Therefore, unpaid work constraints women’s mobility
beyond monetary search-costs (Kwan 2000; Ta et al. 2016).
Domestic work’s spatial and temporal requirements strengthen the household’s
gravitational pull on women’s mobility (Hanson and Pratt 1995, Duberley and Carrigan
2013). Additionally, balancing paid and unpaid activities is seldom considered by public
transportation authorities. This leads to a male-bias in transportation design,
intensifying spatial mismatch effects (Loukaitou-Sideris 2016).
Mobility is also informed by gendered norms and expectations. For example, the
socialization of modern ideals around ‘responsible motherhood’ encompass
employment location. Mothers who work far away from their children often feel
anxious, irresponsible, and judged (Duberley and Carrigan 2013). Furthermore,
commuting is a gendered experience. Male dominance over the public domain between
the household and the job place frequently results in psychological and physical
harassment. In this context, women’s mobility strategies entail avoiding specific places,
or refraining from traveling during particular times of the day (Jiron 2007, Almahmood
et al. 2017).

c. Caregiving as a “coupling” constraint
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Since caregiving often involves the participation of dependents with limited mobility, it
is exceptionally restrictive to caregivers’ mobility. Additionally, dependents’ needs may
not have a regular schedule. Some dependents may require help with asynchronous
activities like using the bathroom, moving within the household, or stepping out on to
the streets. Thus, caregivers frequently have to be “on-call” in close proximity to
dependents. Caregiving, moreover, includes a great deal of supervisory work.
The combination of spatial and temporal constraints with such associative
requirements are known as “coupling constraints” (Hägerstrand 1970). Feminist
literature on economic geography has underscored care as one of the most restrictive
coupling constraints to female labor market supply (Kwan 2000; Ta et al. 2016). Against
the backdrop of a spatial mismatch, therefore, caregivers in segregated communities
may be systematically excluded from the labor market.

d. Occupational segregation and co-location of employment opportunities

Thus far, in line with the original proposition of the spatial mismatch hypothesis, I have
underscored supply-side constraints for female labor market participation. However,
spatial constraints may also arise from labor demand. Prior works have qualified the
spatial mismatch hypothesis by incorporating employers’ preferences and biases in
hiring that segregate the labor market (Blumenberg 2004; Hellerstein et al. 2008). 5

Certainly, occupational segregation also emerges from supply-side factors. Gendered self-selection into
different jobs significantly contributes to the gendered segmentation of paid labor.
5
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Stereotypes associating authority to masculinity contribute to the allocation of
women to lower-paid and less secure jobs (Elson 1999). The image of glass ceilings is
often invoked to characterize this form of occupational segregation. However, people
also face glass walls when selling their labor power. The gendering of particular
occupations allocates similarly skilled men and women to different jobs (Johnson and
Crum-Cano 2011; Nasser 2018). 6
Gender occupational segregation may also be reflected in a geographical division
of job opportunities (Massey and McDowell 1984). Some industries tend to agglomerate
in space to lessen transaction costs and take advantage of knowledge spillovers
(Malmberg and Maskell 2002). A gendered co-location of employment opportunities
would imply that “women’s jobs” are geographically separate from “men’s jobs.”
Therefore, spatial barriers to employment may be gendered beyond mobility
considerations. In an economically segregated city, paid domestic work may be an
example of the co-location of gendered employment since more affluent households
are more likely to hire domestic workers.

e. Historical and political context of the spatial mismatch

The empirical analysis of spatial mismatch effects on female labor market participation
requires methodological qualifications. The residential organization of a city is the

Women are more likely to be hired in sectors involving care work, education, and tourism. Maledominated activities include economics, finance and the military.

6
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outcome of place-specific political and historical processes (Brenner and Theodore
2002). Additionally, gendered differences in mobility and employment accessibility vary
across space and time (Massey and McDowell 1984). The centrality of segregation and
mobility in determining spatial mismatch effects, thus, calls for an empirical examination
that thoughtfully considers the context under which it takes place.
The inclusion of contextual elements in the empirical analysis is relevant for at
least two additional reasons. First of all, from a quantitative analysis perspective, it is
important to highlight the structural determination of low skilled workers’ residential
location. If individual employment preferences are the main determinants of residential
location, the econometric analysis would suffer from self-selection bias. Secondly, a
contextual analysis of residential segregation unveils the systemic sources of labor
market inequalities.

IV.

The social production of a spatial mismatch

In magnitude, Santiago’s economic segregation is similar to the most racially segregated
cities of the United States (Agostini et al. 2017). The city’s residential organization
concentrates less educated (and low-income) workers in the southern and western
banks of the city. In contrast, more affluent and higher-skilled households populate the
northeastern quadrant of the city (see Figure 1). These regions, moreover, offer
diametrically opposed conditions for mobility. While the wealthier areas connect to the
city’s economic center through high-speed highways, 40% of affordable housing
16

residents—and 70% of slum-dwellers—have little to no access to public transportation
(Shirahige & Correa 2015).

Figure 1: The economic segregation of Santiago. Using the Generalized Neighborhood Sorting Index (Jargowky and
Kim, 2005), I have decomposed Santiago’s residential segregation across the 2012 census tracts. Neighborhoods with
above-average mean schooling are green (over 11.5), and neighborhoods that have below-average mean schooling
are purple. The intensity of each color represents how much of the city’s overall segregation is explained by each
neighborhood (in standard deviations). Thus, the more intense green/purple neighborhoods, the higher segregation
levels for high/low skilled segregated neighborhoods. Source: 2012 Census.

Santiago’s residential distribution emerges from market-oriented reforms that
trace back to the late 1970s. 7 Back then, under the authoritarian rule of Augusto
Pinochet (1973-1990), a combination of ideological, economic, and political factors set
in motion the sorting of the city. The return of democratic governments in 1990 did not
change this trajectory. In fact, Santiago’s segregation would peak several years into
democratic rule (Agostini et al. 2017).

The transformation of the urban landscape due to market-oriented reforms is otherwise known as the
neoliberalization of the city (Brenner and Theodore 2002)

7
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Pinochet’s policymaking style was well-known for its reliance on a reduced and
selected crew of political and economic advisors (Silva 1996). Among these privileged
voices, a group of Chicago trained economists were particularly relevant in restructuring
the economic role of the Chilean state. These economists argued that the state’s
intrusion in economic affairs fostered rent-seeking behavior (Krueger 1974), thus
advocating for steep market deregulation and the privatization of publicly owned
enterprises. The dogmatic character of the Chicago Boys’ economic agenda was,
perhaps, best illustrated by the residential market reforms of 1979.
In that year, Neil Smith published an article underscoring that unregulated
residential markets induce rent-seeking behavior among real estate entrepreneurs
(Smith 1979). Yet, this did not bar the Chilean government from swiftly deregulating the
residential sector by eliminating landholding and property-transaction taxes, as well as
auctioning a significant share of state property. In line with Smith’s predictions,
deregulation led to the spike of residential prices in regions with greater accessibility to
Santiago’s economic center (Sabatini 2000; Garreton 2017).
Prior to Pinochet’s dictatorship, a significant number of informal settlements had
spawned in these areas. Salvador Allende’s government (1970-1973) had promised not
to evict settlers, leading many working-class families to occupy undeveloped lands in
otherwise wealthy neighborhoods (Hidalgo et al. 2016). The deregulation of residential
markets, however, turned these lands into profit opportunities for rent-seeking
entrepreneurs (Sabatini 2000). Moreover, the slum-dwellers’ central role in the popular
resistance to the dictatorship motivated the government to dissolve their communal
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settings (Morales 1990). The complementarities between the rent-seekers’ economic
interests and the dictatorship’s political interests, thus, facilitated the resettlement of
nearly 165,000 people between 1979 and 1985 (Garreton 2017).8
Most families were relocated to the southern and western peripheries of the city
(Morales 1990; Garreton 2017). At the time, these regions were scarcely populated,
poorly connected to the rest of the city, and notably unfit to host large human
settlements (Hidalgo 2007). 9 This eviction process was instrumental in initiating
Santiago’s segregationist trajectory.
The 1980 constitutional reform would transform the role of the state in the
provision of affordable housing, consolidating the segregation process. Before the
reform, the state was an active supplier of social housing. Thereafter, the state would
assume a subsidiary role. Instead of publicly providing affordable housing, the state
would subsidize individual families to participate in the private housing market. The
state’s new role made private builders the de facto providers of affordable housing.
Simultaneously, the government loosened restrictions for the construction of affordable
housing projects. Among other reforms, it became permissible to build these projects in
regions that were not fully urbanized (Hidalgo et al. 2016).
The new affordable housing market led private companies to cluster projects in
the cheaper lands located west and south of the city’s center, furthering Santiago’s

8

According to the 1982 census, nearly 5% of people were relocated during this period.

At the time of the evictions, the resettled regions presented poor to no access to clean water, poor
access to electricity, and low levels of transportation connectivity to the rest of the city (Hidalgo 2007).

9
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segregation (Sabatini and Brain 2008). Nevertheless, the urban poor faced significant
barriers in accessing housing subsidies. Among its requirements, these subsidies
required to demonstrate savings. Back then, however, very few low-income families had
a bank account, let alone savings. These difficulties contributed to Santiago’s housing
deficit reaching nearly 40% by 1989 (Garreton 2017). 10
In 1990, when democracy was reinstated, the newly elected government of
Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) promised to decrease Santiago’s housing deficit. They did so
by loosening the requirements on housing subsidies and increasing government
spending. By the year 2000, this policy managed to reduce the deficit to nearly 10%.
However, the elected governments did not transform the role of the state and private
companies in the provision of affordable housing. Thus, the market continued to
allocate the urban poor to the southern and western banks of the city. Consequently, by
2002, the city was significantly more segregated than it was in 1990 (Agostini et al.
2017).
Throughout the 21st century, the structural determinants of Santiago’s
segregation have not changed much. Residential markets continue to lack government
oversight. Additionally, the role of the state in subsidizing the demand for affordable
housing has persisted up until the writing of this article. More recently, some initiatives
at the municipal level have attempted to integrate some sectors of the city by building

The housing deficit in Chile is measured according to the number of families who share the same
household with other families.
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affordable housing in wealthy regions of the city. The magnitude of these initiatives,
however, pales in comparison to the Santiago’s segregation levels.

V.

Methodological issues: Spatial autocorrelation and calculating the spatial
mismatch

Spatial mismatch calculations require the geographical coordinates of both households
and job places. Additionally, in calculating the spatial mismatch effects on labor market
participation, the definition of local markets is crucial. Here local markets are defined as
all employment opportunities between the household and the average point of
indifference between walking (or cycling) and taking a motored mean of transportation.
Since not all individuals have access to the same means of motored transportation,
individual local markets differ according to the ownership of private vehicles. Finally,
given that gender occupational segregation may be spatially represented, individuals
may not be able to access local gendered employment opportunities. In this section, I
assess these issues and present the data used for subsequent econometric estimations.

a. The Data
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The primary dataset in this study’s empirical analysis is the 2012 Origin-Destination
Survey (ODS) for the greater Santiago. 11 The ODS provides coordinates for households
and job places, as well as individual demographic and socio-economic data.
Furthermore, this dataset has a large sample size at over 60,000 individual observations,
including more than 23,000 employment locations. 12 Even though labor market analysis
is not among the survey’s primary objectives, the construction of individual survey
weights considers employment and locational information that match the 2012
census. 13
Additionally, the 2012 census is utilized for identification purposes. High omission
rates in this census led to its repetition in 2017. However, omission rates were lower in
Santiago (lower than 10%) and no systematic bias was found regarding socio-economic
characteristics (Garreton et al. 2020). Therefore, at the very least, the 2012 census may
be considered as a robust and reliable survey that accounts for over 90% of the city’s
population.

b. The spatial autocorrelation of female labor market participation

The quantitative studies of Chilean female labor market participation mentioned in
Section II share a relevant methodological oversight. They fail to address the spatial

Encuesta de Origen Destino, executed by the sub-Secretary of Transport in the Ministry of Transport
and Telecommunications.
12
Around 53,000 observations reside in the greater Santiago area. The dataset is representative to census
zones, an area that is smaller than the municipal jurisdiction.
11

13

See annex for comparison between weighted statistics in the ODS and the 2012 census.
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autocorrelation of labor market participation. Spatial autocorrelation is the co-variation
of some characteristics—in this case, labor market participation—within a geographical
region. By itself, it is not a problem for econometric calculations. If geographical
variations are captured by the model’s independent variables there shouldn’t exist any
identification problems. However, if the model’s residuals continue to be spatially
autocorrelated, then the model’s parameters may be inconsistent and/or biased.14
Table 1 shows the degree and significance of labor market participation’s spatial
autocorrelation by gender and education level. Here, spatial autocorrelation is
measured through Moran’s I, a global indicator of spatial association that ranges
between negative-one and one, where zero indicates no clustering and one or negative
one perfect clustering. If Moran’s I is statistically different from zero, then we can argue
that labor market participation is spatially autocorrelated. 15
Table 1: Labor market participation rate and spatial autocorrelation of LMP by gender and education level. Less
educated is defined as having at most a high school degree, while more educated is defines ad having at least some
years of tertiary education. Source: 2012 ODS.

14

15

For an extensive discussion on these issues, see Gibbons, Overman and Pattacchini (2015), p. 124-136.
See annex 2. for the mathematical expression of Moran’s I and how it was utilized in this article.
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The Table shows that spatial autocorrelation in labor market participation is
especially acute among less educated women. While there are significant levels of
spatial autocorrelation levels among less educated men, this does not include all men.
The participation of those that reside with dependents, defined here as the caregiving
population, does not co-variate with geography. The table also shows labor market
participation rates in the ODS. Of all groups, women’s participation is the lowest and
most geographically concentrated.

c. Operationalizing the spatial mismatch through job density

Following Hellerstein et al. (2008), I use job density as a local measurement of spatial
mismatch. Job density is defined as the total number of job-places in a locality relative
to the sum of working-age residents in the same area. 16 The ODS, however, does not
allow us to use this exact definition since the survey weights do not factor-in
employment location. In fact, unweighted employment locations minimize the
difference between relative municipal job availability between the ODS and the 2012
census (See Table 2).17

People who are enrolled in schooling institutions are not considered as potential competitors for local
employment opportunities. This is because these people may appear as non-participant, but they are not
necessarily spatially constrained.
16

17

The census offers employment location information only at the level of municipal jurisdiction.
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Table 2: Relative municipal employment mean error between the 2012 ODS and the 2012 census.

Thus, job density calculations consider the (unweighted) standardized local job
places over the (weighted) standardized local presence of working-age residents. 18
Highly segregated low-income regions presenting poor access to employment display
job density values close to zero, while non-residential sectors that employ high amounts
of people have a high hob density ratio.
Localities are calculated as a radius around each individual household. To avoid
issues of mechanic endogeneity, I deduct one unit from the total pool of local
employment opportunities from the individual observations who work locally. 19
Considering these qualifications, the job density measurement for individual 𝑖𝑖 residing in
the local area 𝐴𝐴 takes the following functional form:

18

Local competitors are defined below.

On the left-hand side of the econometric equation (labor market participation) the observation would
signal participation. Moreover, the local job that is held by the individual would marginally increase job
density on the right-hand side of the equation. For every individual that is locally employed, this marginal
increase in job density would always be associated with participation, thus leading to biases in the
calculation of coefficients.
19
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Job density varies according to two exogenous assumptions. First of all, we need
to define a locality radius. The larger the radius (i.e., the bigger the locality), the more
homogeneous will job density be across households. Secondly, the numerator and
denominator will vary with the assumed segmentation of the labor market. If, for
example, we assume that all individuals can access all job places, then all job locations
(numerator) and every working age individual (denominator) in the same locality are
considered for the calculation of job density. On the other hand, if we assume
segmentation in labor markets across education levels, then we would only consider the
local job locations that hire individuals with similar schooling levels (numerator) and
local residents with the same characteristic (denominator). Both of these assumptions
are qualified in the following sub-sections.

d. Defining local markets
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Local boundaries must bear actual consequences on employment decisions. If not,
Modifiable Areal Unit Problems (MAUP) may bias the analysis of spatial mismatch
effects (Wong 2004). The MAUP arises when using artificial boundaries to capture a
geographical effect. It is a common problem in spatial mismatch analysis. For example,
prior works often rely on census tracts to define local markets (e.g., Hellerstein et al.
2008). Census tract boundaries, however, do not necessarily carry employment-search
consequences for those who live within them. 20
For this article, locality thresholds are defined as the distance between the
household and the average point of indifference between motored and non-motored
travel (walking or cycling). 21 Since not all individuals have access to the same means of
motored transportation, the average point of indifference between motored and nonmotored travel differs according to car ownership.
There are theoretical and empirical reasons to use this parameter. First of all,
public transportation design does not consider the balancing of paid and unpaid
activities, so employment opportunities which are not within walking distance may
entail higher logistical costs for those conducting unpaid work (Loukaitou-Sideris 2016).
Second, motored transportation involves higher economic search-costs than non-

20
Imagine a household located in a mostly residential zip code area which is adjacent to a zip code area
populated by multiple employment opportunities. Since the household’s zip code area is mostly
residential, the calculated job density for that observation would be relatively low. This would not be a
problem if the household was located in the middle of the zip code area. However, what would happen if
the household was located at the edge of the zip code area nearing the business district?

This entails that we have as many localities as we have households and that localities overlap with each
other.
21
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motored transportation.22 Finally, public transportation is also a gendered space and, as
such, presents deterrent conditions for female travel. According to the 2019 National
Survey of Urban Safety, Chilean women feared victimization significantly more than men
while waiting for or while using public transportation.23
I calculate this indifference point using the ODS. On average, people who own
automobiles walk to their destinations when they are within a one-kilometer radius
from their homes. On the other hand, those whose means of motored transportation
are limited to carpooling or public services, on average, walk up to 1.4 kilometers from
their place of residence before taking a motored mean of transportation.24 25 According
to these thresholds, nearly 20% of employed people in Santiago work within their local
boundaries. This is more likely for less educated workers, with 21.7% of them being
locally employed. Among these, women are disproportionately represented. While
18.4% of less educated men are locally employed, 27.1% of less educated women work
within non-motored distance from their home.26

e. Labor market segmentation and three models of job-density
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In Santiago, the high costs of public transportation sparked national-level protests in October 2019.

23

According to the National Survey on Urban Safety by the National Institute of Statistics (INE, for its
acronym in Spanish). In Spanish, the survey is Encuesta Nacional Urbana de Seguridad Nacional (ENUSC).
24
For adults between 18 and 65 years of age.
25

For greater detail in how these averages were calculated, please refer to the annex.
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These numbers do not consider live-in domestic workers.
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Not every local resident will qualify for the same job opportunities. Due to labor market
segmentation, some jobs will only be available for people who meet particular criteria.
Taking this into account, and for robustness purposes, three different job density
models are listed below.

i. Economic activity model

In this model, labor market stratification is not a factor. It considers all working-age local
residents (denominator) who are not enrolled in schooling institutions as potential
competitors. Similarly, all employment positions held in the locality are considered as
potential job opportunities (numerator), regardless of the skill and gender of individuals
in these positions. The rationale behind this model is that overall economic activity may
generate employment opportunities for all workers in the form of multiplier effects
(Moretti 2010). In this model, every member of the household faces the same job
density.

ii. Education stratification model

In this model, relevant local employment opportunities are held by workers in the same
education bracket as the observed individual (numerator). Similarly, relevant local
competitors share the same education level as the individual observation
(denominator). Hence, less and more educated job densities are calculated for every
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locality and ascribed to individuals according to their education level. The less educated
job density measure includes people who hold at most a high-school degree while
skilled job density comprises people having at least some college education. Individuals
within the same household face the same job density only if they share education levels.

iii. Education and gender stratification model

Earlier, I argued that gendered occupational segregation in the labor market can entail
different geographical landscapes for women’s and men’s work. This model seeks to
capture these differences. While maintaining the distinction between less and more
educated labor, this model also accounts for gender in the calculation of job densities.
Therefore, individuals within the same household will face the same job density only if
they share education level and gender.
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for these three models. The most salient
features in Table 3 are the outliers illustrated by the large discrepancy between job
density at the 99th and 100th percentiles. The concentration of less educated
employment opportunities in regions where few less educated workers reside partially
explains these outliers. Nevertheless, they may also be a byproduct of the calculation of
local boundaries.27 Hence, they must be addressed in the subsequent econometric
analysis.

Even though the ODS considers a region larger than the greater Santiago area, some observations are
located in peripheral localities of the dataset. This means that, for some localities, the observation of
potential competitors may be censored leading to high job density values. Six observations were dropped
27
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for different models of job density using the 2012 ODS.

f. Visualizing job density clusters

Job density is a geographical variable that can help explain spatial autocorrelation in the
labor market. If this is the case, we should expect for job density to be spatially
autocorrelated as well. If our main thesis is correct, job density’s distribution should also
reflect Santiago’s residential segregation.
Moran’s I is a global indicator. In other words, just a number that does not
communicate the location of job density clusters. Therefore, I decompose Moran’s I into
Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA). Following the literature, observations
presenting statistically significant (p-values<0.01%) high measures of job density that
neighbor other observations with high job density values are classified as part of a highHigh cluster (statistically high job density neighboring other statistically high values).
Conversely, observations with low local measures of job density in proximity to other

due to not having any observations for the denominator. For example, in some localities there were no
skilled female residents.
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low-dense localities are assigned to a low-Low group (Anselin 1995). 28 29 Observations
that do not meet any of these criteria are not clustered into any group, and thus are not
depicted in the LISA maps.
Figure 2 illustrates the LISA maps for less and more educated job density measures.
On the top-left corner of the figure is the Moran’s I global statistic. Moran’s I confirms
the clustering of job density in Santiago for both less and more educated workers.
Moreover, as depicted by the red dots (each dot is a household), households in highHigh neighborhoods are mostly clustered in the downtown and northeastern regions of
the city, where more affluent families reside. Blue dots represent clusters of low job
density localities. The LISA maps illustrate how Santiago’s spatial mismatch is a
reflection of the city’s residential segregation.

28

The mathematical expression for LISA can be found in annex 4.

We could also find high-Low and low-High clusters. This would mean that a significantly job-dense
locality neighbors significantly low-dense areas (high-Low), or that a significantly low-dense area Is
surrounded by regions that are significantly dense.
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Figure 2: Spatial autocorrelation for less and more educated job density using the 2012 ODS. Red dots represent employment
positions located in regions concentrating significantly high levels of job opportunities. Blue dots represent employment
positions located in regions presenting significantly low levels of job opportunities. The left panel shows employment positions
that are held exclusively by less educated individuals (who hold at most a high school degree). The right panel represents
employment positions held by more educated individuals. Source: 2012 ODS.

Santiago’s northeast concentrates employment opportunities for less and more
educated workers. There are very few low-Low clusters for less educated workers, and
more noticeable amount for more educated workers. This means that there are very
few employment opportunities for more skilled workers outside the northeast. This
does not imply a spatial mismatch for more educated workers, since they mostly reside
in the northeast. However, it does entail few economic incentives for these workers to
move outside the northeast.

VI.

Spatial mismatch and female labor market participation
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There are potential endogeneity problems when calculating spatial mismatch effects.
Individuals may choose to live closer to employment opportunities if they have high
preferences for participation. If this were the case, labor market preferences could
contribute to Santiago’s segregation, making job density coefficients endogenous and
possibly biased. Nevertheless, as outlined in section III, the urban poor’s residential
location is born out of structural transformations rather than personal preferences. This
is more evident when observing residential mobility patterns among less educated
women.

a. Endogeneity issues I: Residential mobility patterns

While the ODS does not inform on residential mobility patterns, the 2012 census does.
The census asks every citizen about their mothers’ birth location (unfortunately, not
their fathers’). Therefore, we get can observe residential mobility patterns for female
caregivers currently living with their children. Narrowing the data to working mothers
we can examine mobility patterns for those who have revealed their preferences for
labor market participation.
In the census, job density is calculated at the municipal level. I group each of
Santiago’s thirty-six municipalities into six groups (each comprising six municipalities)
ranked from lowest to highest density. If caregivers with higher preferences for
participating in the labor market were able to choose their residential location freely, a
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significant flow of working women would move from low-dense areas to high-dense
regions. However, this is not the case.
Over 83% of less educated working mothers born in the lowest-dense regions
still live there. In fact, among all density groups, this one is the least mobile.
Furthermore, those born in the highest-dense regions were the most mobile. Nearly
45% of less educated working mothers born in high-dense regions moved away.
Figure 3 depicts these mobility patterns. Here, Santiago’s segregationist
development is most evident. A small percentage of less educated women born into
low dense groups moved into higher dense groups. Those born in higher dense areas
moved into lower dense regions at a significantly larger rate. This evidence suggests that
less educated women with preferences to work are not able to self-select into regions
with high job density.

Figure 3: Fraction of less educated working mothers who moved away from their place of residence. The x-axis shows
their new place of residence, in parenthesis is the average job density for each group. Source: 2012 census.
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Additionally, residential mobility patterns for less educated participant and nonparticipant mothers are not significantly different from each other. Table 4 summarizes
the percentage point differences between these two groups for all possible mobility
combinations. A positive value entails that the percentage of labor market participants
moving between density groups is higher than that of non-participants. For instance, the
rate of labor market participants who were born in density group 1 but currently reside
in density group 2 exceeds the rate for non-participants with the same mobility pattern
by 0.8 percentage points. The diagonal bolded numbers represent percentage point
differences between participant and non-participant mothers who did not move.
Out of thirty-six possible combinations, thirty-four show no significant
differences in residential mobility patterns. The two combinations that are significantly
different in statistical terms (G1 to G4, and G1 to G6) are not economically significant.
Only a very small fraction of the population born in the lowest density group moved to
groups four and six (2% and 1%, respectively). These statistics reaffirm that labor market
preferences are not a significant driving force in the residential location of less educated
households.
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Table 4: Percentage point differences in residential mobility between less educated participant mothers and nonparticipant mothers, t-test for significance levels (Census 2012).

The scenario is slightly different for more educated workers (Figure 4). In this case,
groups two and three are the most mobile (23% and 24%, respectively) and nearly 14%
of more educated women born in group two now reside in the city’s densest region.
This means that OLS coefficients for spatial mismatch effects for more educated female
caregivers may be positively biased. Considering this endogeneity issue, our primary
analysis is restricted to less educated caregivers.

Figure 4: Fraction of skilled working mothers who moved away from their place of residence. The X-axis shows their
new place of residence, in parenthesis is the average job density for each group. Source: 2012 census.
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b. Endogeneity issues II: Individual and household characteristics do not
predict job density

If the identifying assumption is correct, and less educated caregivers are unable to sort
into job-dense locations, individual and household characteristics should not predict job
density. 30 Table 5 shows that this is the case. Conditional on municipal fixed effects, OLS
regressions show that individual and household characteristics are not significant
predictors of job density, especially in the presence of dependents.
Table 5: OLS regression for job density measures on individual and household characteristics for less educated women.
These calculations consider municipal fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the municipal level.

30

I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the anonymous reviewer who pointed this out.
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c. Econometric model

In line with prior works on Chile, labor market participation is modeled as a function of
individual and household level determinants (Larrañaga 2006, Contreras et al. 2011). 31
Additionally, two mobility variables are considered: the presence of a metro station
within the observation's locality, and a dummy variable indicating if the individual holds
a driver's license and owns a vehicle. Descriptive statistics for individual and household
level regressors are summarized in Table 6.

At the individual level we control for: schooling, age (and age squared), total number of other adult
women in the household (this variable may be relevant since the presence of other non-dependent adults
may ease domestic and caregiving responsibilities, and thus facilitate labor market participation), total
number of other adult males in the household, the log of the household’s income per capita discounting
the observation’s personal income, physical conditions that might affect participation (pregnancy,
cognitive and physical disabilities). At the household level we control for: number of children between 0
and 3, 4 and 6, and, 7 and 14 years old separately; number of people who might need intensive care
(cognitive and physical disabilities), and if there is a paid domestic worker in the household.
31
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations in parentheses) for individual and household level
regressors.

The Table shows some relevant differences across education and gender in
means for urban mobility. Women and men with access to higher education are more
likely to hold a driver license than less educated individuals. Female caregivers,
moreover, are the least likely to have one. Additionally, more educated households
have more than one private vehicle on average, even as their access to the subway
network is higher. Less educated women, and especially caregivers, present the poorest
conditions to travel across the city.
Municipalities play a central role in the provision of public child and health care
services. Thus, the calculations include municipal fixed effects to account for
geographical differences in accessing these services. Finally, job density measures are
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included to capture spatial mismatch effects. In line with Hellerstein et al. (2008), an
interaction term between job density and schooling (in years) is included to capture
differences in spatial mismatch effects across the education spectrum.32

𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾ℎ + 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 + 𝜃𝜃𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖ℎ
+ 𝛿𝛿(𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑖𝑖ℎ ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖ℎ𝑚𝑚

Where 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖ℎ is a dummy variable equal to one if individual 𝑖𝑖 in household ℎ

participates in the labor market, and zero otherwise. 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖 , is a vector of individual

variables, 𝑌𝑌ℎ is a vector of household variables, and 𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚 represents municipal
level fixed effects.

To avoid endogeneiy issues, the primary sample for the analysis is restricted to
less educated female caregivers 33 The model is calculated using OLS with standard
errors clustered at the municipal level. For robustness purposes, the parameters of the
model are recalculated after winsorizing job density measures by 1% and 5%. 34
Additionally, local job density is recalculated at double the walking-distance rate (2-

The primary subset for analysis considers less educated caregivers. However, within the less educated
group there is significant variation in schooling. Around 40% of less educated caregivers did not complete
secondary education.
32

Potential caregivers include adults who reside with children under 14 years of age and/or other adults
who present severe mobility constraints. The ODS informs on people who face mobility constraints due to
physical and cognitive disabilities.
34
Winsorization is a mechanism for dealing with outliers that assigns less-extreme values to outliers. In
this case, the observations that are in the first and last percentile of job density are assigned the values at
1% and 99% respectively.
33
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kilometer radius for drivers and 2.8-kilometer for non-drivers) to test if results hold up
when easing locality assumptions.
As a secondary analysis, and for comparison purposes, the model is calculated
for all less educated women and men, as well as for more educated caregivers.
Additionally, we examine if local job density has an effect on less educated female and
male caregivers’ access to formal and full-time employment.

d. Results for less educated caregivers

i. Spatial mismatch as a source of gender inequalities

The spatial mismatch effects for less educated female caregivers are summarized in the
left three columns of Table 8. For this group, all specifications of local job density are
positive and statistically significant. Furthermore, the interaction term between job
density and schooling level is negative and statistically significant. Since schooling levels
are, on average, higher than job density levels, this negative parameter entails than in
places where job density is very low the net job density effect may be negative. In other
words, when education levels are closer to complete secondary schooling, the likeliness
of a caregiver participating in the labor market are significantly higher in job dense
regions than in “job thin” localities.
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Table 8: OLS estimations for working age less educated women and men residing with dependents and are not
enrolled in any schooling institution.

The unequal job density distribution generates gender inequalities between
women and men residing with dependents. The last three columns on Table 8 display
the job density coefficients for male caregivers. None of these is statistically significant
from zero. Furthermore, job density effects are significantly different between men and
women (See Table 9). Residential segregation, therefore, accentuates the gender
inequalities emerging from the patriarchal division of labor.
Table 9: T-test for differences in job density effects between women and men residing with dependents.
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ii. Analyzing the magnitude of job density effects across Santiago’s
municipal jurisdictions

Interaction effects, as well as the tall number of localities, complicate the analysis of the
magnitude of spatial mismatch effects. Additionally, since the different job density
models vary in value, we cannot simply compare coefficients to analyze the differences
between these measurements.
To address these issues, we analyze net job density effects for a less educated
female caregiver of average schooling (10.3 years) facing the average job density level
for their respective municipal jurisdiction. Figure 5 net municipal job density effects,
highlighting the lowest and highest average effects.
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Figure 5: Municipal average job density effects over less educated women residing with dependents of average
schooling. Outlined in red are the lowest net effects and in blue are the municipal jurisdictions with the highest net
effects.

These maps once again reflect Santiago’s residential segregation. The southern
and western regions of the city that concentrate the urban poor (especially La Pintana,
Cerro Navia, Renca, and Pudahuel) have the lowest net effects. On the other hand, the
city’s northeast (Santiago, Providencia, Vitacura, and Las Condes) concentrates the
highest effects. In the economic activity model, the labor market participation of a less
educated female caregiver of average schooling (and everything else equal) is 24%
higher if she resides in the top 5 highest job dense municipalities vis-à-vis living in the
top 5 less dense jurisdictions. The education stratification model and the education and
gender stratification predict a 28% and 39% difference, respectively.
These differences in magnitude portray the interaction between occupational
segregation and residential segregation. The regions that agglomerate wealthier
households also provide gendered employment opportunities for less educated women,
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especially in the form of domestic service. Thus, the ‘glass walls’ of the labor market
may in fact influence Santiago’s spatial mismatch.

iii. Spatial autocorrelation of residuals

As outlined earlier, the spatial autocorrelation of labor market participation poses a
potential problem for interpreting these results. If residuals continue to be spatially
autocorrelated, then the model’s parameters may be biased and/or inconsistent. Table
10 displays Moran tests for each model’s residuals, showing that these are not spatially
autocorrelated and that they explain the spatial distribution of labor market
participation.
Table 10: Spatial autocorrelation for each of the models’ residuals. Moran's I was calculated using lm.morantest from
the R package spdep (set seed 123).

iv. Robustness I: Winsorization of job density measures.

Earlier, we saw that there are significantly high outlying job density values. To ensure
that these are not driving the results, the data is transformed through winsorization.
This process assigns less-extreme values to observations with especially high and low
values. Here, we winsorize the top and bottom 1% values, as well as the top and bottom
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5%. Table 11 summarizes OLS results after winsorization, indicating that the parameters’
statistical significance holds after the transformation process.
Table 11: Winsorized coefficients for less educated women and men residing with dependents. Municipal fixed effects
are considered, and standard errors are clustered to the municipal level.

v. Robustness II: Re-defining locality

Table 12 shows the coefficients for the different job density models when defining
localities at double the walking-distance rate. That is, 2,800 meters for individuals who
do not have access to private vehicles and 2,000 meters for those that do. The results
show that the education stratification model and the gender and education
stratification model are robust to the widening of local job markets, confirming that
occupational segregation in the labor market may play a significant role in determining
spatial mismatch effects.
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Table 12: Job density coefficients for localities defined at double the walking distance (2,000 mts for individuals who
drive, and 2,800 for those that do not).

e. Secondary analysis: Access to high-quality jobs and spatial mismatch
effects on other subpopulations

i. Informality and full-time employment

The spatial mismatch may also affect caregivers’ access to formal and full-time
employment. Even though this question probably deserves an entire article, Tables 13
and 14 show preliminary evidence for these effects. 35 36 The results show that when
men reside with dependents in job-thin regions, they are more likely to participate in

Informal job places are defined as the workplace of self-employed less educated workers. domestic
workers (the law regulating domestic work in Chile did not come into place until 2014) and unpaid family
workers. All other forms of employment are considered formal.
35

The independent variables used for these regressions are the same as the ones used for predicting labor
market participation.
36
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the informal labor market and in part-time employment. For women, however, job
density effects are not significantly different from zero. These results underscore the
impoverishing effects of residential segregation on less educated caregiving families.
While female caregivers are less likely to participate in the labor market due to the lack
of available job opportunities, men are more likely to be employed in lower quality
workplaces.

Table 13: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to formal employment for less educated
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.
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Table 14: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to full-time employment for less educated
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.

ii. Spatial mismatch effects on less educated non-caregivers and
more educated caregivers

Although our primary analysis focuses on less educated caregivers, it is worthwhile to
show if residential segregation affects the labor market participation of other
subpopulations. As argued above, unpaid domestic work can also be a source of
mobility constraints at the same time as it is unevenly divided between men and
women. Non-caregivers, therefore, may also be affected by spatial mismatch effects.
Table 15 shows that this does not seem to be the case.
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Restricting the population to less educated women and men who do not reside
with any dependents, we observe that job density effects are not significantly different
from zero for either group. For women, however, the parameters do maintain the same
direction as before.
Table 15: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on labor market participation for less educated women
and men who do not reside with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.

Even though this may be subject to self-selection problems, Table 16 shows that
job density is not a significant determinant for more educated caregivers’ labor market
participation. The negligible spatial mismatch effects illustrate the economic inequalities
emerging from residential segregation. Spatial mismatch effects are reserved only for
less educated households.

51

Table 16: Job density coefficients for spatial mismatch effects on access to formal employment for more educated
women and men residing with dependents. Regressions consider municipal fixed affects and standard errors are
clustered at the municipal level.

VI.

Final remarks

This paper’s findings underscore the entrenched relationship between residential
segregation and labor market inequalities. Cities themselves are a structural product
and, as such, take on an intermediary role between the forces that produce them and
the labor market. The uneven urban geography generates dissimilar conditions for labor
market participation across different subpopulations. In Santiago, market-oriented
reforms alongside mass evictions produced an economically segregated city that offers
unfavorable conditions for the less educated female caregivers’ participation.
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The mobility restrictions emerging from unpaid care labor, in conjunction to the
agglomeration of employment opportunities in wealthy neighborhoods, are behind the
adverse effects of segregation on less educated women’s participation. The economic
lives of women like Gabriela, who balance paid and unpaid responsibilities in areas with
few employment opportunities, are a true testimony to our findings.
Segregation reinforces the economic inequalities between low-income and
affluent families. In households where female adults are unable to participate in the
labor market, families fail to augment their earnings pool with additional income from
female employment. Additionally, working men in these residences are more likely to
participate in more precarious labor markets. Secondly, segregation may also contribute
to inequalities within low-income (heterosexual) households. In these households,
women’s economic dependence on male wages likely intensifies masculine control over
females’ work and bodies.
The scope of this article is limited to analyzing segregation’s unequal effects on
labor market participation. However, future research should address the relevance of
residential segregation on gender inequalities within paid work. The fact that less
educated women’s labor market participation is disproportionately affected by
segregation may be evidence of a more elastic labor supply at the level of the city.
Nevertheless, at the local level mobility constraints could result in a more inelastic
female labor supply when compared to men’s (Schmid 2016). In line with emerging
literature on monopsonistic labor markets, a lower labor supply elasticity increases the
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employer’s wage-setting powers (Card 2018). Thus, segregation could potentially be an
explanatory factor for the gender wage gap.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LIMITS TO CARE
A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS OF CHILE’S CARE SYSTEM AND ITS CRISIS
I.

Introduction

Chile is aging rapidly. According to official estimates, nearly 30% of the working-age
population (15+) will be 60 or more in 2035. Not only will Chile be the oldest country in
Latin America, but it would have experienced one of the fastest demographic transitions
in recent history (Villalobos Dintrans, 2018a). The pace of this transformation calls for a
rapid understanding of its challenges. This article contributes to this endeavor by
analyzing one of aging’s most serious byproducts: rising adult dependency levels.
Adult dependents are working-age people who need assistance with daily living
activities. In other words, they need care. Is the Chilean care system prepared to meet
the increments in the demand for care? This paper utilizes political economy analysis to
answer this question. I find that emerging heterogeneity in household structures is
significantly complicating the system’s ability to provide care. Furthermore, without
structural reform, it is unlikely that adult dependents will receive the care they need.
The Chilean care system interlocks several subsystems of care, including stateprovision, market-provision, and family-provision. The market and state subsystems,
however, play a secondary role. The family is so essential to the Chilean care system
that some have defined it as an unsupported familial regime of care (Martin, 2015;
Palacios, 2016).
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The centrality of the family in the provision of care entails that the system rests
on the unpaid labor of family members to provide care. By 2017, nearly 70% of them
were women. 37 The system, therefore, rests upon a patriarchal division of labor that
disproportionately allocates unpaid work to women (Folbre, 2021). Like any other
division of labor, space limits the patriarchal division of labor (Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III;
Weber, 2019). In this case, the family-space. In this article, I examine the care system’s
reliance on the patriarchal division of labor by calculating the significance of patriarchal
limits in the overall provision of care.
Here, I identify two significant limits to the patriarchal division of labor: female
presence and household size. Using OLS estimations and a large dataset from 2017, I
show that dependents who reside in smaller households with less female presence are
significantly less likely to receive any care whatsoever (even from secondary sources).
My estimations show that dependents who reside with at least one non-dependent
woman and one non-dependent man are more likely to receive care under the current
system. On the other hand, adult dependents living without non-dependents are the
least likely to receive any assistance. Considering that nearly 25% of adult dependents
live in such conditions, this is a major cause for concern.
Additionally, my analysis shows that the proportion of dependents residing
without non-dependents has increased significantly in the last decade, and it is likely to
continue growing. Using Machine Learning (ML) prediction methods, I impute
dependency levels to large surveys from 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. Until

37

According to the 2017 CASEN.
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now, such detailed information on dependency levels existed only from 2015 onwards.
The ML predictions show that the share of dependents living with at least one female
non-dependent and one male non-dependent has decreased from more than 42% in
2006 to less than 30% in 2017. The share of dependents residing without any nondependents has increased from 19% to 25% in the same period.
Population aging is likely behind this transition. Older adults are more likely to
reside in smaller households than average dependents. As a more significant proportion
of dependents has become older, their family structure distribution has converged to
that of the elderly. In this context, the familial care system is less likely to provide the
necessary care supply. Hence, a profound restructuring of the care system that removes
the family from its center is necessary to avoid a crisis.
The article is structured as follows. Section II introduces the current state of adult
dependency in Chile. Section III frames this article’s analysis in the literature of care
crisis. Then, Section IV analyzes the political economy of adult care. Additionally, it
analyzes the limits of the familial provision of care and how they affect the overall
provision of care. Section V uses ML methods to analyze how dependents’ family
structures have evolved in the last decade. Section VI concludes the article by discussing
the implications of this paper on the restructuring of the care system.

II.

Adult dependency in Chile
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Until recently, nationally representative surveys on adult dependency did not exist. In
2015, Chile’s National Socioeconomic Characterization Survey (CASEN, for its acronym in
Spanish) included adult dependence as a measurable variable for the first time. 38 Here,
we use the 2017 CASEN survey to capture the social distribution of adult dependency.
This dataset consists of 216,439 observations.
Adult dependency is defined according to individual capabilities for performing
Basic Daily Activities (BDAs) and Instrumental Daily Activities (IDAs). BDAs include
eating, bathing and grooming, moving within the household, using the bathroom, lying
down or getting up from bed, and dressing. IDAs consider the capabilities to step out to
the street, doing errands, doing housework, and making or receiving calls.
Dependency levels are defined according to the dependent’s i) capability to
perform an IDA or BDA, and ii) their need of assistance in performing an IDA or BDA
(these are independent questions in the survey). Someone may present difficulties in
performing an IDA or BDA, or they could completely lack the ability to do so. Similarly,
someone could require help sometimes or always. Considering this, four dependency
levels are defined in ascendant order: potential, mild, moderate, and severe. Table 7
describes each of these:

38

http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/encuesta-casen
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Table 7: Dependency levels according to functional capabilities.

According to the 2017 CASEN, there are 993,630 adult dependents in Chile. Over
7% of the total adult population. Age is a significant determinant of dependency.
Almost 75% of adult dependents are 60 or more. A loss of functional abilities
accompanies the natural decomposition of our bodies. Nearly 16% of adults between 60
and 80 years of age are dependent to some degree. For adults over 80, the dependency
rate exceeds 50%. Figure 6 illustrates the exponential relationship between age and
dependency rates. The severity of dependency is also a function of age. Figure 7 shows
the distribution of dependency levels according to age.
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Figure 6: Dependency rates by age. LOESS method used for smoothing. Source: CASEN 2017

Figure 7: Dependency levels distribution by age. LOESS method used for smoothing. Source: CASEN 2017.
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Age, however, is not the sole determinant of dependency. Socioeconomic factors
also matter a great deal. For instance, income levels determine access to quality
healthcare and healthy lifestyles. Strenuous physical work, vis-a-vis mental work, has
been found to entail significantly higher levels of dependency in old age (Russo et al.,
2006). Participation in recreational activities, also correlated with earnings, substantially
improves cognitive health in old age (Verghese et al., 2003; Ferreira et al., 2015). For
these reasons, dependency rates are significantly higher in the lower echelons of the
income distribution. Figure 8 depicts dependency rates for individuals with different
schooling levels. There is an evident contraction in dependency at higher schooling
levels. This is especially true for people between 60 and 79 years of age, meaning that
the less educated become dependent at an earlier stage.
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Figure 8: Dependency rates by age group and schooling. Source: CASEN 2017.

Less-educated individuals are also poorer. Therefore, adult dependency rates are
disproportionately high in low-income neighborhoods. The spatial distribution of adult
dependency marks a crucial difference between the childcare and adult care systems.
Table 8 shows the linear correlation between adult and child dependency rates and
municipally averaged per capita income (in logs). Child dependency is defined here as
children under 14, and dependency rates are the total population of dependents to total
adults. A 1% increase in average income is associated with a 3.3% decrease in adult
dependency rates. There is no statistical relationship between child dependency rates
and income.
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Table 8: Linear regression for adult and child dependency rates. Dependency rates are calculated as the fraction of
dependents over the total adult population.

The CASEN survey offers another critical piece of information regarding the
conditions of adult dependents: whether they receive assistance or not. Dependents can
be cared for by household members (internal care), out-of-household individuals (paid
and unpaid external care), or both. They can also not receive any care whatsoever.
Figure 9 shows the distribution for each of these categories. Most dependents receive
care exclusively from household members. Moreover, of the near one-million adult
dependents in Chile, almost 30% do not receive any assistance. The considerable
mismatch between the demand for care and its supply begs the question: is Chile
undergoing a crisis in adult care?
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Figure 9: Distribution of caregiving. Internal care is defined as care provided by household members. External care is
defined as care provided by out-of-household individuals.

III.

Analytical framework: A crisis of care?

Most countries have a formal definition for an economic crisis. Economic breaking
points are clearly defined to capture the beginning and end of a crisis. They are tracked
and measured. Care crises, in contrast, do not enjoy such treatment (even less for adult
care crises). The measurement of care activities is, at best, preliminary. State officials
have not seriously considered the definition of official care breaking points.
Nevertheless, scholars and activists are paying increasing attention to the care crisis.
Emma Dowling (2021) and others (Thorne, 2004; Himmelweit, 2007) define the
care crisis as a simultaneous process that lowers access to care even as it raises the
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barriers to provide it. Similarly, Beneria (2008) and Fraser (2017) argue that the collapse
of specific social
structures has constrained care provision, making it less available. These definitions
depict the care crisis in quite a similar light to an economic crisis. During an economic
crisis, the mode of production’s capability to produce is severely restricted. In a care
crisis, the care system does not care enough. Both types of crises, moreover, are
originated at the systemic level.
The systemic nature of care crises underscores their complexity. Care systems
have an intricate architecture of multiple interlocking and interdependent social
structures (Folbre, 2021, p.10). Furthermore, social structures are composed of human
relations that are, more often than not, based on hierarchies of contradictory interests.
The hierarchical nature of these structures stabilizes them. Contradictory interests, on
the other hand, are sources of instability. When people in the lower echelons of a given
social structure gain power, the hierarchy loses its ability to stabilize the structure. If the
social structure is fundamental to the system’s inner workings, then the whole system
might be destabilized and enter into crisis.
The interlocking and interdependent nature of social structures adds another layer of
complexity to care crises. The normal functioning of one social structure may create
instability in another. Once again, this is similar to an economic crisis. Extensive
scholarship describes how the institutional arrangements that regulate social life,
the mode of regulation, periodically tensions the essential hierarchies in the capitalist
mode of production (Boyer, 1990; Aglietta, 1998). This is true even as regulation and
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production can complement each other. Similarly, the interlocking structures that
compose the care system may simultaneously complement and contradict each other
(Folbre, 2021). Changing conditions transform the balance between contradictory and
stabilizing forces. Systemic crises occur when the system is unable to adapt to these
changes (Ibid.).
The complexity of care crises can be periodized into an ongoing cycle of different
moments (Archer, 1995). The first moment is that of structural conditioning. Caregivers,
non-caregivers, and dependents find themselves in a network of pre-existing social
structures. Then, there is a moment of social interaction. Here, agents and pre-existing
structures interact to condition a third moment: social elaboration. At this third
moment, individual and collective agencies can either reproduce or transform the preexisting social structures, thus creating new structural conditions.
This article’s analysis of the adult care crisis examines these moments in an
inductive manner. We start by analyzing the current structural conditions to care. Then,
we contextualize the current conditions as part of an ongoing process of structural
elaboration. By examining the evolution of structural changes in the care system over
the past decade, we can identify if the system’s care provision has become weaker or
stronger. This process of structural elaboration sheds light on the system’s abilities to
meet increments in the demand for care and its capacity to overcome a care crisis.
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IV.

Structural conditions to care: The political economy of adult care and its
limits

The care system is composed of interlocking subsystems of care. There are at least three
subsystems of care in Chile: state-provided care, market-provided care, and familyprovided care. Each of these subsystems presupposes a particular division of labor,
which allocates care work and distributes costs. However, divisions of labor have limits
that affect the subsystem’s care supply. Hence, the capability of each subsystem to
provide care informs the overall capacity of the system to supply care. This section will
analyze each of these subsystems and their limits, emphasizing the familial subsystem of
care.
Limits to the division of labor are an essential component of care supply. Limited
space for expanding the division of care labor reduces the likelihood of the subsystem’s
care supply to meet rising care demand. The fundamental emergent property of the
division of labor is that it allows for specialization. Individuals will carry out more
specialized tasks as the division of labor is deeper, increasing social productivity (Weber,
2019). Conversely, a restricted division of labor incentives individuals towards
diversification. Since combining care provision with other economic activities is difficult
(Kwan, 2000; Loukaitou-Sideris, 2016), limited space for the division of labor will hardly
be conducive to increasing the care supply. A reduction in the space for the division of
labor may actually contract supply, leading to a care crisis.
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a. Abstract social space, not just markets, limit the division of labor

The division of labor is a system of exchange. This led Adam Smith to famously claim
that the size of the market limits the division of labor (Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III).
However, what is the market? Smith certainly did not mean that an actual concrete
market would limit the division of labor. Instead, he speaks of an abstract place in our
common imaginary, socially enforced by norms, institutions, regulations, and supply and
demand. The forces that expand or contract the limits of the market-space are exclusive
to this particular configuration. Divisions of labor can also take place outside this space.
For instance, an explicit chain of command structures the division of labor within
most capitalist firms. Even though exchange exists within the firm, demand and supply
mechanisms do not determine the firm-level division of labor limits (Simon, 1991).
Rather, it expands or contracts according to the decisions of those at the top of the
hierarchy.
Command mechanisms are present in other spaces as well, with varying qualities.
The division of labor within the state, for instance, is the composite of multiple
interdependent and inter-scalar chains of command at different scales. Existing
institutions (e.g., the executive branch, democracy) and territorial boundaries establish
its limits (Jessop, 2016). Within the family, patriarchal systems have historically
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commanded the division of labor. Biological and social reproduction limit the size of the
household division of labor (Folbre, 2021).
The multiple spaces under which the division of labor takes place calls for a
qualification of Smith’s comment. It is abstract space, not markets, that limit the division
of labor. We can find at least three of these spaces within the care system: the state, the
market, and the family. The division of labor, and its limits, are particular to these
places. Moreover, these limits also stamp the relevance of each subsystem within the
overall care system. Abstract sites that are severely restricted will provide less care (i.e.,
secondary subsystems). On the other hand, more relevant to the system are places
where the division of labor has provided ample supply of care (I.e., primary
subsystems). A crisis in the care system, therefore, is more likely to originate in primary
subsystems.

b. The neoliberal state and its limits

Since the 1980s, when a handful of military men controlled the state, three principles
characterize Chile’s welfare system: austerity, subsidiarity, and focalization (Valdivia
Ortiz de Zarate, 2015). These are the pillars of the so-called neoliberal state. The
principle of austerity portrays a ‘fiscally responsible’ state that significantly cuts down
on discretionary expenditure.39 Even though austerity is a common practice in

The long-lasting characteristics of austerity in relation to the temporary nature of crises signals for some
authors that austerity is inherently ideological (Jessop 2016, p.236).
39
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neoliberal economies, Chile’s fiscal spending is amongst the most restricted. Among
OECD countries, Chile ranks second to last in public social expenditure as a percentage
of GDP (11.4%). 40
Fiscal spending is especially low in adult care (Palacios, 2016; Villalobos Dintrans,
2018b). Chile’s most comprehensive adult care program is the Assistance and Care
National Sub-system (ACNS), 41 implemented under the government of Michelle
Bachelet (2012-2016). This program offers assistance to dependents and their caregivers
by providing resources, information, and networks to facilitate home care. The ACNS,
however, only covers 21 of the 345 municipal jurisdictions in the country. In 2017, the
program served 937 adult dependents. That is 0.1% of adult dependents.42
The state also provides long-term care services, home care services, and day
centers for elderly dependents. In line with focalization principles, these services are
rigorously targeted. Benefactors must be elderly (60+) citizens in the poorest 60% of the
population, abandoned or not receiving family care, and presenting at least moderate
dependency levels. Together, these programs serve almost 3.400 dependent adults
(0.35% of adult dependents). Public spending in ACNS plus these three caregiving
services cost the state 0.004% of the country’s GDP.

40

https://www.oecd.org/centrodemexico/medios/gasto-publico-social-ocde.htm

41

Sub-sistema Nacional de Apoyos y Cuidados (https://www.chilecuida.gob.cl/).

Information on budgets and total beneficiaries for every social program in Chile can be found at
https://programassociales.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/programas/
42
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Finally, the state also offers subsidies43 to municipalities and NGOs to provide
long-term care services to low-income older adults with moderate to severe
dependency. These subsidies actually represent the state’s highest-spending account in
adult care. In 2017, these subsidies benefited 5.634 adult dependents. These subsidies
accounted for over 47% of the state’s total spending in care provisioning.
The pillars of neoliberalism limit the expansion of the state’s care supply. The
neoliberal ideal of a ‘small’ state is perhaps the clearest in adult care. In total, the state
only provides care to about 10,000 people or 1% of adult dependents. Today, the
number of dependents who do not receive any assistance exceeds the state’s supply by
almost thirty times. The more than forty years of neoliberal rule have assigned the state
to a secondary role in the care system.

c. The limits to the care market

Here, we will consider the market provision of care in its broadest possible sense. Any
form of commodified care, including paid domestic workers, is regarded as a part of the
market. Under this definition, the limits of the market could be ample. Global care
chains, for example, cut across international borders to cover the demand for care in
one place by contracting care somewhere else (Hochschild, 2014). Demand for
commodified care is crucial for the expansion of the market. In Chile, even though
nearly 30% of dependents do not receive care, market demand is low. Less than 8% of

43

Fondo Subsidio ELEAM.

71

adult dependents access the care market. 44 The fact that adult dependents are
disproportionately poor is most likely behind this fact.
The care market is overrepresented by the wealthy. Although 9% of adult
dependents are in the top quintile of the income distribution, 30% of dependents with
access to the market belong to this group. The hiring of live-in domestic workers
partially explains this overrepresentation. 42% of live-in domestic workers caring for
adult dependents work in top quintile households. However, these workers only
represent 7.7% of the care market.45
Unequal access to the care market is reflected in out-of-home care as well. The
economic segregation of Chilean cities has facilitated long-term care providers to cluster
in wealthy neighborhoods (Villalobos Dintrans, 2018a). Private medical services,
moreover, are virtually inaccessible for adult dependents. The unregulated private
health insurance market (ISAPRES) crowds out adult dependents by heavily raising their
premiums (Villalobos Dintrans 2018b). Hence, the state ensures 96% of the adult
dependent population (FONASA). 46
In Chile, economic inequality and high poverty rates among adult dependents limit
the market provision of care. Rising dependency rates will likely increment the market's
care supply. However, in an unequal country like Chile, the market will probably
continue to target wealthy individuals. The focalization of state- and market-provided

44
45
46

According to the 2017 CASEN.
According to the 2017 CASEN.
In contrast, less than 85% of the national population is publicly insured.
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care entails that the family and unpaid female caregivers are at the heart of the Chilean
care system.

d. The primary subsystem of care: The family

According to the 2017 CASEN, household members care for 56.7% of adult dependents.
Considering that 29% of dependents do not receive any assistance, almost 80% of
assisted dependents are cared for by family members. The care system strongly relies
on family caregivers, especially women. Hence, scholars have labeled the Chilean adult
care system as an unsupported familial regime of care (Palacios, 2016).
A patriarchal system structures the division of care labor in most families. This
system ensures an ample supply of unpaid care through the exploitation of women
(Folbre, 2021). 47 However, it also structures care shortages. Here we analyze the basic
structure of the patriarchal care supply and its influence on the overall provision of care.
As we will see, the limits to the patriarchal division of labor severely affect the system’s
care supply.

i. The patriarchal family structure and caregiving

Exploitation can be defined beyond the productive sphere. Nancy Folbre (2021) defines it as an unfair
division of gains and costs.
47
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Most classical economists dismissed the social character of the household division of
labor. 48 Marx, for example, argued that the household division of labor was a product of
nature rather than exchange (Marx 1990 [1867], p. 471-3). Smith was even less
attentive, arguing that the division of labor was limited to the space of the market
(Smith 1937 [1776), Ch. III). This omission is more than a couple of centuries old.
Aristotle, for instance, argued that masculine rationality was the natural source of
patriarchal rule over slaves and women.49 What is perhaps more surprising is that this
rationale persisted long after the works of classical economists. Neoclassical economists
have defended the patriarchal division of labor on very similar grounds to Aristotle.
According to them, its efficiency relied on the altruistic nature of male household heads
(Becker, 1985). Their models explicitly assume that “men know best.”
However, as feminist scholars have pointed out, the patriarchal division of labor
is neither natural nor efficient. Patriarchal structures are systems of collective power
that privilege mature heterosexual men over others (Folbre, 2021, p. 21). In household
care, patriarchal structures enable men to enjoy the benefits of care without bearing
the brunt of its costs. The patriarchal order, moreover, is not sustained on the altruistic
or rational nature of men but by a complex ensemble of political, cultural, and economic
forces (Ibid.).
Two kinds of power regulate patriarchal systems: bargaining power and
normative power. Bargaining power represents the political, legal, and economic

48
49

For a rigorous review, see (Folbre, 2009).
Aristotle, Politics, Book I, Part V (http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.1.one.html).
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entitlements that an individual can wield to influence (care) labor allocation.
Additionally, since a division of labor is an inter-dependent social structure, bargaining
power is also determined by each household member’s fallback positions or exit
strategies (Folbre, 2021). On the other hand, normative power emerges from shared
imaginaries and expectations around gender and work (Agarwal, 1997).
Women “doing gender” often implies caring for family members. The
pervasiveness of gender norms explains why the distribution of unpaid work has
remained asymmetrical even as women have entered the labor force (Bittman et al.
2003; Beneria et al. 2015, p.60). 50 Normative power affects the division of labor
differently than bargaining power. Gender norms are internalized. Therefore, to meet
gender expectations, women may supply more care than men even if they do not live
under the same roof. In other words, normative power entails that the patriarchal
system does not necessarily need a live-in patriarch to enforce it. The historically
gendered character of bargaining and normative power has ensured women’s provision
of unpaid care. Hence, female presence is crucial to ensure the patriarchal care supply.
In addition to female presence, household size also matters. The patriarchal care
supply relies on female exploitation. Since care is a public good, women assume
caregiving costs while not ripping most of its benefits (Folbre, 2021). This is an internal
contradiction within the patriarchal system: caregiving can impoverish caregivers. In
larger households, however, this contradiction is partially alleviated. More sizeable

50

In Chile, scholars have attributed Chile’s particularly low female labor market participation to the
prevalence of gender norms (Contreras et al., 2010).
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homes provide more space for the division of labor and, therefore, more space for
specialization. In turn, the specialization of some (male) household members in paid
employment allows for income-pooling, leveling the material conditions of paid and
unpaid workers. Income-pooling, then, characterizes the exchange element within the
patriarchal division of labor. Without it, the internal contradictions of patriarchal
systems become more apparent, rendering them unstable. Hence, household size also
conditions the patriarchal care supply.
The factors that condition patriarchal supply provide evidence for the familial
subsystem’s reliance on patriarchal systems. Table 9 shows that households without
female presence and/or smaller in size are less likely to internalize care provision. The
table divides dependents’ families into four different types: dependents residing with i)
at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent man (32% of dependents
live in this families), ii) at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent
men (22%), iii) at least one non-dependent man and zero non-dependent women (22%),
and iv) zero non-dependent adults (24%).

Table 9: Household type distribution for adult dependents. The table summarizes average household size (according to
the presence of adult non-dependents), care internalization rates, and the female share of unpaid household
caregiving.
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The conditions for the patriarchal division of labor are more fertile in households
with at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent man. These
households are larger in size and have a female presence. Therefore, it is not surprising
that almost 80% of dependents residing in these households receive care from a family
member. In more than 80% of these cases, that family member is female. Dependents
who live with at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent men
configure smaller residencies that retain a female presence. These households
internalize care at a slightly lower rate to that of larger configurations with male
presence. The normative character of caregiving may be more evident when we
compare these households with their counterparts: households with at least one nondependent man and no women. Although similar in size, these households internalize
care at a significantly lower rate (72% versus 56%). Households without any nondependents, moreover, are the least likely to internalize care (16%).
Table 9 confirms the strict reliance of the familial subsystem of care on the
patriarchal exploitation of women. When the conditions for it are not ripe, the
subsystem’s care supply decreases. Patriarchal systems, therefore, simultaneously
ensure and limit the provision of care. The primary role of family care within the care
system underscores the relevance of patriarchal limits for the current system to close
the gaps in care.

e. Who doesn’t receive care?
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Under the current structural configuration, who doesn’t receive care? Using the 2017
CASEN survey, we can calculate if the structural limits to the different subsystems of
care determine who does and who doesn’t receive assistance. Nearly 30% of
dependents do not receive care. As one might expect, individuals with lower levels of
dependency are less likely to receive assistance. Figure 10 shows the percentage of
dependent adults receiving assistance by dependency level.

Figure 10: Percentage of dependents receiving care according to dependency levels.
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45% of potentially dependent adults and 70% of mild dependents receive care. Most
moderate and severely dependent adults receive some form of care (90% and 98%,
respectively). Lack of assistance at the early stages of dependency can bring about
serious public health concerns. Without proper care, individuals with low dependence
levels may continue to lose functional abilities and accelerate severe dependency (Metz,
2000; Golinowska & Sowa, 2017).
The Chilean system of care is characterized by its inadequate provision of
preventive care services (Palacios, 2016; Villalobos, 2018a). However, how much of this
omission is owed to the familial subsystem of care? So far, we have seen that the
Chilean care system is extremely reliant on family care. Different family types,
moreover, internalize care responsibilities at different rates. Smaller and more
masculinized households supply less care than larger households with a female
presence. Hence, dependent adults residing in households with low care supply may be
more likely to not receive any kind of care.
I test this hypothesis using the 2017 CASEN and OLS methods. The dependent
variable takes the value of zero if the dependent adult does not receive any assistance
and one if they do. Moreover, I use two population subsets. First of all, I calculate the
determinants of being cared for for all adult dependents (12,660 individuals). Then, I
limit the dataset to potential and moderate dependents (6,974).
I calculate two models for each population subset. Model 1 groups dependents
into four family types, which are then used as categorical regressors. These categories
are: dependents living with i) at least one non-dependent female and one non-
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dependent male, ii) at least one non-dependent woman and zero non-dependent men,
iii) at least one non-dependent male and zero non-dependent females, and iv) with zero
non-dependents. Model 2 considers the total of non-dependent women and nondependent men as determinants for being cared for. This model captures the effects of
household size on the likelihood of receiving care.
Both models also consider a series of household and individual determinants.
These include the total number of children younger than 14 in the household, the
household income per capita, dependency level, the dependent’s gender, age, and
schooling. The outcomes for each model are presented in Table 10:
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Table 10: OLS regression output for all dependent adults and potential and mild dependents using the 2017 CASEN.
Estimations were calculated using survey weights.

The regressions show that dependents living in family types that are less fertile
for the patriarchal division of labor are significantly less prone to receive any care at all.
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The difference between families with male and female non-dependents and households
with only female non-dependents is the least significant. This result underscores the
reliance of the Chilean care system on unpaid female labor. Moreover, dependents that
only reside with male non-dependents are significantly less likely to receive care.
Dependents residing without any non-dependent adults are the least likely to receive
care. These results mimic the internalization rates for each household type presented in
Table 9. Model 2 shows that family size matters for receiving care. The presence of nondependent women and non-dependent men increases the likelihood of receiving care.
However, the effects are higher for non-dependent women. 51 Model 2 further
underscores the reliance of the system on unpaid female labor. Moreover, the effects
are different for potential and mild dependents than for the average population. People
at early stages of dependency are less likely to receive care if they reside in smaller
households or without the presence of male and female non-dependents. 52
When we analyze the remaining variables, we find some interesting results.
Controlling for family types, the number of children in the household is not a significant
determinant for receiving care. This is surprising since it has been observed elsewhere
that children often help with taking care of dependent adults (Folbre, 2021). Moreover,
household income per capita and the dependent’s schooling level present an inverted-U
relation with the likelihood of receiving care. This is in line with the political economy of

T-tests for the differences between the effects of non-dependent women and non-dependent men are
significant to 1% for all dependents, and 5% for mild and potential dependents.
51

52

Statistical tests for these differences can be found in the annex (Section A.1).
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the Chilean care system. The state targets the poorest households, while the market is
hyper-focalized on the wealthiest families. However, income and education effects are
very small.
The structural limits to the provision of care are significant predictors for
receiving care. Therefore, the current structural conditions of the care system help
explain the gap between the demand for adult care and its supply. However, has the
care system always experienced these conditions? In the next section, we examine the
last decade of structural elaboration. Our findings show that the structural environment
has become increasingly adverse for the current system to provide care.

V.

How did we get here and where are we going? Trajectories in adult
dependent family structures and the structural elaboration of a care crisis

The limits to the patriarchal division of labor play a significant role in reducing the
system’s care provision. Hence, shrinking limits to the patriarchal division of labor would
signal a loss in the system’s capability to provide care. Our analysis here shows that this
is the case. Moreover, if this trajectory continues, it is unlikely for the current care
system to meet increments in demand. A care crisis may then be forming on the
horizon.
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a. The shrinking of Chilean family structures: Internal and external factors

Instability in social systems may arise from internal contradictions and external factors
(Folbre, 2021). The exploitative nature of patriarchal systems is a source of internal
instability. Exploited groups (i.e., women) are more likely to contest existing structures
when they gain collective power. Conversely, external factors may obstruct the
exploitation of women. The demographic transition, and its effects on the structural
conditions of the care system, are most likely a result of both internal and external
factors.
Household-size reduction is expected in growing economies. However, in Chile, it
has been strikingly fast. Since the turn of the century, Chilean households have reduced
from an average of 3.6 members to 3.1.53 To contextualize, in the United States, the
average household size was 3.6 in 1970, and it is yet to reach 3.1.54 The fast reduction of
Chilean homes has been associated with declining fertility and marriage rates (Salinas
2011). In turn, the internal weakening of patriarchal structures partially explains these
declining rates.
In terms of bargaining power, women have made important strides over the last
couple of decades. For instance, Before the COVID-19 pandemic hit, women had

From 3.6 in 2002 to 3.1 in 2017, according to the census (https://www.censo2017.cl/wpcontent/uploads/2018/05/presentacion_de_la_segunda_entrega_de_resultados_censo2017.pdf).
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https://www.statista.com/statistics/183657/average-size-of-a-family-in-the-us/
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significantly increased their labor market participation. In 2000, 36.5% of working-age
participated in the labor market. 55 This number rose to 48.9% by 2017. Additionally,
there have been considerable improvements in family law. In 2004, Chile was the last
country to legalize divorce, decreasing male power over women’s bodies (Salinas, 2016).
Reproductive contraception has also become more widely available in the past 20 years.
For example, since 2013, all public health institutions are obligated to stock and
distribute the “morning-after” pill.
However, as other authors have pointed out, the explanatory power of internal
factors needs to be nuanced (Salinas, 2016; Ramm, 2016). First of all, gender norms
continue to be an essential factor in allocating unpaid work, especially in lower-income
households. Research has shown that “traditional” values that associate women to
unpaid work have weakened among the younger and more educated people but remain
strong among older and less educated individuals (Contreras & Plaza, 2010; GómezUrrutia et al., 2017). Since low-income and elderly homes have higher adult dependency
rates, it is less likely to observe the transgression of gender norms in such spaces.
Moreover, the masculinization of unpaid care provision has been much slower than the
feminization of paid employment. Alejandra Ramm (2016) observes that women are still
more likely to take on the lion’s share of unpaid childcare responsibilities (Ramm, 2016).
Our analysis shows a very similar trend for adult dependents. When there are non-

https://www.ine.cl/docs/default-source/ocupacion-y-desocupacion/publicaciones-yanuarios/publicaciones/mujeres-en-chile-y-mercado-del-trabajo---participaci%C3%B3n-laboral-femeninay-brechas-salarialesa.pdf?sfvrsn=ade344d4_3
55
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dependent women in the household, the likelihood of them becoming the primary
caregiver exceeds 80%.
The limits to the internal explanation have led scholars to look for explanations
to the demographic transition in external factors. In Chile, women born in wealthy
households) are significantly more likely to marry than those born in lower-income
homes. Therefore, lower-income women are far more likely to be born into singlemother or non-married couples’ households, further decreasing their likelihood of
marrying (Salinas, 2011). Persistent economic inequality has reproduced and deepened
this pattern over time, as lower-income households are increasingly conformed around
more unstable structures (cohabitation) or become smaller (Ibid., Ramm & Salinas,
2019). Since dependents tend to be from lower-income backgrounds, external economic
factors may be reducing their household size.
Have dependent households reduced in size? The literature has paid little
attention to this question. The lack of reliable data on adult dependency may be behind
this omission. The Chilean authorities began to measure adult dependency in the CASEN
only in 2015. Therefore, until now, we have not had reliable information on the
evolution of families with adult dependents.

b. How to analyze the distribution of dependent’s family structures over
time?
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Over 90% of dependents in 2017 are disabled people. However, less than half of the
adult disabled population is dependent (42%). Analyzing the family distribution of
disabled individuals may not provide an accurate depiction of the actual distribution of
adult dependents. Similarly, as presented above and elsewhere (Villalobos Dintrans,
2018a), age is not the sole determinant of dependency. Hence, examining the family
composition of the elderly may also lead to a misguided analysis of the condition and
evolution of dependent family structures. Figure 11 compares the actual family
distribution of adult dependents in 2015 and 2017 to that of the elderly (75+) and
disabled adults.
Disabled people are more likely to live in large households, while the elderly
usually live in smaller households. As we can see, people with disabilities are
significantly more likely to reside with at least one non-disabled woman and one or
more non-disabled men than dependents. Conversely, elderly individuals are more likely
to reside without any other non-elderly adults than any other group. The actual
distribution of adult dependents lies somewhere in between the distribution of the
elderly and the disabled.
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Figure 11: The family type distribution of dependents, disabled people, elderly people, and elderly disabled individuals
in 2015 and 2017.

The distributional differences between elderly and disabled populations pose a
challenge for analyzing the trajectories of the care system’s capability to meet
increments in demand. If disability drives dependency rates, the distributional pressures
towards larger families may facilitate the familial system’s care provision. On the other
hand, if the aging population is pushing dependency levels, then the system may be
entering a crisis.
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As an initial approach, we can statistically compare the family distribution of
dependents to that of old age, disability, and a combination of both. Paerson’s Chisquared and the Log likelihood ratio are two commonly used goodness of fit tests in the
analysis of categorical data distribution. The null hypothesis for both tests is that the
distribution of dependent family structures equals the distribution of disabled or elderly
peoples’ family structures. Tables 11 and 12 summarize the outcomes of the tests for
each distribution in 2015 and 2017, respectively. None of these groups accurately
represents dependency. The family distributions of disabled people, however, do have
lower coefficients. This means that their distribution is closest to that of dependents.
Interestingly, the coefficients for elderly distribution decreases from 2017 to 2015, and
those for families with disabled members increases.

Table 11: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of the elderly, disabled people,
and elderly disabled in 2015. Survey weights were included in the calculations.
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Table 12: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of the elderly, disabled people,
and elderly disabled in 2017. Survey weights were included in the calculations.

c. Using machine learning to predict dependency since 2006

Since dependent’s family structures cannot be proxied through disability or age, I turn
to Machine Learning. Machine learning is nothing more than different statistical and
probabilistic techniques that optimize prediction. Its use has gotten particular attention
in the medical community, where observers have noted that machine learning
significantly improves our capacities to predict different medical conditions (Cruz &
Wishart 2006; Weng et al. 2017; Blomberg et al. 2019). To my knowledge, there have
not been any attempts to predict dependency using these techniques.
Overfitting is one of the most significant issues when using machine learning
methods (Foster, Kropowski & Skufca, 2014). For this reason, we must consider a series
of precautions. First, the dataset used for training the predictive model must be
sufficiently large relative to the number of predicted categories. Here, we pooled
individual data from the 2015 and 2017 CASEN surveys (212,730 and 175,076
observations, respectively) for predicting only two categories: non-dependency and
dependency. 56 After dropping the observations that do not possess complete
56

Dependency includes potentially dependent individuals.
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information, we are left with 374,513 observations. The predictors were chosen
according to a range of medical and socio-economic variables. All CASEN surveys since
2006 share these.57
For validation purposes, I randomly sample the pool data into a training and a
testing dataset. 58 The training dataset consists of 187,769 observations (50,1% of total
observations) and the testing dataset is comprised of 187,769 observations (49.9%). I
use six different algorithms to predict dependency and then choose the superior
combination of precision and accuracy. In the annex, you can find an explanation for
each algorithm (Section A.2). Also, you will find the methodology for choosing the
Random Forest algorithm as the most appropriate for our analysis. The annex also
presents Paerson’s Chi-Squared tests showing that the model accurately predicts the
distribution of dependents’ family structures (Section A.4). Having chosen the
appropriate predicting model, I predict adult dependency for six different CASEN
surveys between 2006 and 2017.

d. Adult dependency since 2006

The predictions show a clear increment in dependency rates over the past decade (Table
13). In 2006, a little over 4.5% of adults were dependents. This number rose to 7.4% in

Hence, I will predict dependency for the years 2006, 2009, 2011, 2013, 2015, and 2017. The 2003
CASEN has very similar medical data with differences in the periodization of the data. 2003 was not
considered due to this reason. The list of predictors can be found in the annex, Section A.3.
58
Using set seed (12345) in R.
57
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just eleven years. In the same period, the fraction of adults over 60 years of age
increased significantly. In 2006, according to estimates from the National Institute of
Statistics 59, people over 60 represented 15.9% of adults. The same estimates show that
this number rose to 20.2% in 2017. The simultaneous increments in dependency rates
and older population are not a coincidence.

Table 13: Predicted dependency rates since 2006.

Figure 12 shows the predicted distribution of dependents according to age
bracket between 2006 to 2017. Here, dependents between 15 and 59 years of age fall
under the category of younger dependents. In eleven years, older dependents have
increased their share by almost 10%. This more than doubles the increment in the share
of 60+ individuals over the total adult population. Furthermore, by 2035 the fraction of
60+ adults will graze 30%. The dramatic increase in the older population will most likely
entail a similarly momentous increment in dependency levels.

59

Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (INE), https://www.ine.cl/ .
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Figure 12: Growth in the share of older (60+) dependents between 2006 and 2017.

e. Changes in dependents’ family structures since 2006: A crisis in the
horizon

As dependents become increasingly older, their family structures change as well. Older
people are more likely than the disabled population to reside in small households. The
predictions show a convergence in the household structure distribution of dependents
and older adults. Figure 13 depicts this convergence since 2006. That year, more than
42% of dependents resided with at least one non-dependent woman and one nondependent man. The rate of dependents in these households has continuously
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decreased to around 30% in 2017. Moreover, dependents living without nondependents have increased from under 20% to around 25%. The rate of dependents
residing with one non-dependent man has slightly increased as well.

Figure 13: Machine learning predictions for the share of dependents in each family type between 2006 and 2017.
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Figure 14: Average number of non-dependents residing with dependents according to machine learning predictions.

The trajectories presented in Figures 13 and 14 reflect a severe obstacle for the
familial subsystem of care. As dependents’ families become increasingly smaller, the
likelihood of receiving unpaid care decreases. In other words, the shrinking limits of the
family-space are increasingly complicating providing adequate care under the current
system. Female presence, moreover, has not counteracted household shrinkage (Figure
14). Therefore, both essential elements to the patriarchal division of labor are
increasingly missing. By insisting on the female unpaid provision of care, the system is
trading women and ghosts.
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The shrinkage of dependents’ household size is ubiquitous across the income
distribution. However, it is especially dramatic in lower-income homes. Figure 15 shows
the average magnitude of non-dependent adults in households with at least one
dependent by income quintile. Households in the poorest 20% of the population (or first
quintile) have continuously decreased in size from having an average of nearly 1.9 nondependent adults to less than 1.3 in 2017. This represents the most significant decrease
among all income groups. Since dependency rates are higher in the lower echelon of the
income distribution, household reduction in this group places additional concerns on
the system’s capability to supply necessary care.
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Figure 15: Average number of non-dependents residing with dependents by income quintile according to machine
learning predictions.
.

The predictions show that dependent households have followed a similar trend
to the overall structure of Chilean family structures. Hence, the change in dependent
family structures may also respond to internal and external structural pressures. More
research is necessary to elucidate if this is the case. However, what is certain is that the
emergent configuration of dependents’ households is increasingly challenging the
patriarchal division of labor. As the share of older dependents grows, the observed
trajectory is likely to continue. This would further weaken the current care system.
Without reform, a crisis in adult care is almost inevitable.
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VI.

Final remarks: New spaces for care

Chile’s care system has historically relied on unpaid family caregivers (i.e., women) to
meet the demands in adult care. The demographic transition, however, is a challenge
that the system is unlikely to overcome. This article analyzes the current configuration
of the care system through a political economy lens, showing that the system is not only
exploitative but unsustainable as well. Machine learning predictions show that
dependency rates are rising even as dependents increasingly reside without nondependent family members. Through econometric analysis, moreover, this paper has
shown that the patriarchal system that structures the familial provision of care fails to
provide for dependents under these family conditions. Hence, for the Chilean care
system to overcome the demographic challenge, it must undergo a profound structural
transformation.
First of all, the family should no longer be at the center of the system. The
shrinkage of the family complicates a division of labor capable of providing care.
Moreover, the incentives for non-dependents to diversify rather than specialize in care
are higher in these smaller settings (Weber 2019). Our findings show that trajectories
dependent family structures have mimicked that of the overall population. Internal and
external structural elements have shrunk the limits to the patriarchal division of labor.
98

As this continues to happen, the familial system will increasingly lose its ability to
provide care.
Moreover, in the context of extreme economic inequality, the market is seldom
an option for care. The few long-term care services that exist in Chile tend to focalize on
higher-income dependents. Adult dependency, however, is more common in lowerincome communities. Only when presented with state subsidies, the market provided
care for this population (Villalobos Dintrans 2018b). It is also worth noting that
international experience tells us that the market also penalizes caregivers (Folbre,
2018). Therefore, a market-centered approach may not be appropriate to meet the
increments in the demand for adult care.
A new political accord regarding the role of the state in care may be needed to
overcome the challenges of the demographic transition. It would undoubtedly require
higher fiscal spending. However, most importantly, it would require the state to create
an appropriate space for the division of care labor. The dangers in defining this new
abstract space are plenty. The state, unlike the market, has fewer self-regulatory
mechanisms to increase or decrease the size of the division of labor. Therefore, a hypercentralized structure in the provision of care may result in an elongated and overbureaucratized space. Such a space may result in the inefficient use of public revenue.
On the other extreme, if the provision of the state is too localized, the limits to the
division of labor may prevent it from effectively meeting the increments in demand (as
is the case for families today). The challenge of the impending crisis of care is, therefore,
to find a middle ground.
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CHAPTER 3
THE ECONOMIC CASE FOR COMMUNITY CARE AIDES

I.

Introduction

Dependency rates among Chilean adults will skyrocket in the upcoming decades
(Villalobos DIntrans, 2018). However, the familial care system that has characterized
Chile since its inception is unlikely to meet the current demand for adult care (Garcia
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II). Without reform, increased levels of dependency will
undoubtedly entail an economic toll, especially for those who currently bear the brunt
of caregiving costs: women. This article analyzes the economic and gender implications
of a reform seeking to replace the familial care system with a community-based care
system.
In particular, I analyze the impact of institutionalizing Community Care
Aides (CCA) at the heart of the care system. CCAs are home and out-of-home care aides
that assist and accompany adult dependents in their communities. Furthermore, CCAs
are (paid) municipal employees. The program, hence, redistributes the costs of caring
from the family to the state. However, there are other economic implications to such a
program.
In Canada and the United States, the evolving role of health care aides has
significantly increased the sector’s efficiency (Berta et al., 2013; Quinn et al., 2016).
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Moreover, a recent study showed that investing in home care aides would significantly
boost aggregate demand in the United States (Palladino, 2021). This economic boost is
likely to be paired with inequality reduction. The home care aide position does not
usually require tertiary education. Therefore, lower-income individuals will
disproportionately benefit from the program.
Here, I examine the economic benefits of the CCA through a theoretical lens.
This article uses neoclassical economic analysis to evaluate the program’s theoretical
repercussions on economic growth and inequality reduction. These parameters are
particularly relevant for Chile. In 2019, millions took the streets to protest against
neoliberal policies that produced economic growth at the cost of deepening and
reproducing staggering inequalities. Then the Covid-19 pandemic hit and, in one year,
GDP fell by almost 6%. Today, the country necessitates inclusive economic policies that
can boost growth while simultaneously decreasing inequality.
In this paper, I present a consumption-leisure-caring model to analyze the
impact of the CCA and two other programs: a Universal Basic Income (UBI) and a stipend
for domestic workers. Using baseline data, the simulations of the model show that the
CCA outperforms the other policies in both boosting the economy and reducing
inequality. The program will create a disproportionate amount of employment
opportunities in economically depressed regions, increasing consumption levels among
lower-income households. Moreover, the program will allow thousands of caregivers,
especially women, to increase their labor supply by trading away several hours of
unpaid work. The increment in consumption and aggregate demand, together with the
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expansion of labor supply, help disperse the inflationary pressures often associated with
fiscal spending.
However, the success of the program is not guaranteed. Trust is essential to the
economic prospects of the CCA. If families do not trust the care of their loved ones on
community caregivers, the benefits of the program dissipate. In this article, I examine
the potential impact of the CCA in three different scenarios—low, medium, and high
trust environments. The analysis shows that trust conditions the program’s potential to
boost growth and decrease economic and gender inequality. Trust, therefore, is a risk
factor that needs addressing in the design and implementation of the CCA.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, I present the main characteristics
of the CCA program. Then, in Section III, we discuss the theoretical framework used for
our analysis, underscoring the role of temporal and spatial constraints on caregivers’
labor supply. Section IV introduces a leisure-consumption-caring model with gendered
expectations and exogenous residential location for individual maximizers. This model
does not consider family-decision making processes (a later section addresses this
shortcoming). Section V analyzes the CCA program through the model’s lens, showing
that the CCA will simultaneously increase local job density and decrease the domestic
provision of care (conditioned on trust), boosting consumption and labor supply.
Then, in section VI, we review alternative policies through our model. Section VII
offers a simplified parametric version of the model presented in Section IV comparing
the effects of the CCA on economic growth, inequality, and the distribution of domestic
care with those emerging from the UBI and paying domestic caregivers. We show that
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the potential economic benefits of the CCA exceed those of the alternative policies.
Section VIII introduces a theoretical extension to our individual-maximization model
that includes family-decision making processes through a Cournot-Nash noncooperative equilibrium analysis. This model shows that the CCA can potentially help
achieve a balanced distribution of unpaid domestic care in heterosexual extended
households.

II.

Community Care Aides Program

By 2035, nearly 20% of Chilean adults will be 65 or older. 60 One of the challenges arising
from a rapid demographic transition is the higher need for adult care and its
implications for the economy. Today, nearly 30% of adult dependents do not receive
any assistance. 61 Elsewhere, I have observed that a critical component in Chile’s lack of
adult care supply is the system’s over-reliance on family care. As families have become
smaller, their ability to cover the incremental demands for care has dwindled (Garcia
Dellacasa 2021, Ch. II). Restructuring the care system is required to meet the challenges
of the demographic transition.
The Community Care Aides (CCA) program is an alternative to restructure Chile’s
care system. At a structural level, the CCA does two things. First, it reallocates the role

60

According to estimates from the National Statistics Institute (INE, for its acronym in Spanish).

61

According to the 2017 CASEN survey, Chile’s largest publicly available dataset.
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of primary adult caregiving provider from family members (i.e., women) to the
community. The CCA is a universal caring service where adult dependents receive care
from people in their communities, providing respite to their family members. Secondly,
the CCA reassigns the costs of caregiving from families to the state. Community
caregivers are not volunteers. They are state agents employed by local municipal health
clinics (CESFAMs or CECOFs.) Hence, they are paid for their work with tax money.
The program seeks to increase the coverage of adult care by addressing one of
the current system’s most salient shortcomings. The increasing number of dependent
adults residing in small households has rendered the familial system unsuitable for
providing care (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021; Ch. II). The CCA program incentivizes people to
provide care for their neighbors even when they reside alone. Moreover, the CCA may
also generate efficiency gains for the health sector by preventing increments in
dependency levels. People who receive care at early stages of dependency are less likely
to worsen their condition (Thomas and Blanchard, 2009).
Trust is essential for the CCA to succeed. If people are unwilling to participate in
the program, unpaid family members will continue to provide care. The community
aspect of the program is crucial for trust-building. People tend to trust more in those
more similar to them and have had more extended social interaction (Alesina & La
Ferrara, 2002; Freitag & Traunmuller, 2009). However, experience is also crucial to trust
(Ibid.). Therefore, the CCA must provide a quality service for which training caregivers is
necessary. Since CCAs are nested in the Public Health system, they are required to go
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through formal training. 62 This way, the CCA program seeks to professionalize care
provision while building trust in its services.
A crucial component of the CCA is that it improves the working conditions of
caregivers. First and foremost, caregivers are paid for their work. Although this requires
further research, elsewhere, I have proposed a sliding-scale payment based on
employment flexibility. 63 Severely dependent adults require full-time supervision and
assistance. Caregivers assisting them would earn 1.5 minimum wages. 64 Moderate
dependents may not require full-time assistance, but they do need periodical visits.
Part-time CCAs caring for moderate dependents would receive one minimum wage.
Finally, moderate and potentially dependent adults may require help with occasional
and sporadic activities. Sporadic CCAs would make 75% of the monthly minimum
wage. 65
The program would also improve caregivers working conditions in other ways.
Caring alone, as is the case in most families, increases the subjective workload
associated with caring (Sandoval et al., 2019). Caregivers who participate in social
networks (like the church, for example) consistently have better mental health (Ibid.,

62

This should not increase the cost of the CCA too much. Fortunately, the training for community care
aides already exists in Chilean health centers This is because the figure of the community caregiver is
already present in the system. However, today, community caregivers are volunteers.
63
ciperchile.cl/2021/03/02/desafios-de-la-transicion-demografica-hacia-un-sistema-de-cuidado-deadultos-dependientes-remunerado-y-comunitario/
64

In Chile, the minimum wage is established on a monthly basis.

Under Chilean labor law, someone who works less than full-time is entitled to receive the direct fraction
of the minimum wage corresponding to their workday. For instance, if someone works 50% of a full-time
position (45 hours per week), they would be entitled to 50% of the minimum wage.
65
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Villalobos Dintrans, 2019). The CCA program seeks to institutionalize these networks
through regular meetings between caregivers and municipal authorities.
The CCA, therefore, has the potential of closing the adult care gap while
simultaneously improving the conditions of those who care. However, this comes at a
high cost for taxpayers. This is why it is essential to underscore the additional economic
implications of the CCA program. In what follows, I will examine some of these
implications in the context of Chile. A country where most of its population resides in
economically segregated cities (Garreton et al., 2020).

III.

Caring in segregated cities

In Chile, employment opportunities cluster in regions far away from lower-income
neighborhoods. This spatial mismatch is especially problematic for the labor market
participation of female caregivers who face the highest penalties for mobility (Garcia
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I). Moreover, dependency rates are disproportionately high in lowincome communities, further restricting female labor market participation (Garcia
Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II).
The coinciding problems of residential segregation and unequal dependency
rates present us with a unique opportunity for inclusive development. The CCA program
would create jobs in communities where employment opportunities are scant.
Additionally, it would allow families to externalize care provision, effectively removing
one of the most critical barriers to less educated women’s participation in the labor
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market. To understand the effects effects of the CCA on growth and inequality, we must
intengrate the spatial context of caregiving under the familial system of care.

a. Temporal constraints on female labor supply

The patriarchal division of labor disproportionately allocates unpaid domestic and care
responsibilities to women. Whether it is due to lower bargaining power or enforcement
of traditional gender roles, women continue to undertake most unpaid responsibilities
(Folbre, 2021). Among these responsibilities, unpaid domestic care is particularly
restrictive to labor market participation. In fact, in Chile, female caregivers spend
around double the time on unpaid responsibilities than non-caregiving women. 66
Some neoclassical theorists have underscored care’s temporal constraints as a
crucial component of women’s labor supply (Carmichael and Charles, 1998; Heitmueller,
2007). In their models, informal caregiving affects labor supply in a contradictory
manner. Since time is finite, and most jobs do not offer completely flexible working
days, unpaid responsibilities increase the opportunity cost of labor market participation,
contracting labor supply through substitution effects. On the other hand, dependents
cannot always sustain themselves economically. Therefore, caregiving responsibilities
may also entail income effects that expand labor supply. If substitution effects are
higher than income effects, then informal care reduces labor market supply. If, on the

According to the 2015 National Time Use Survey (ENUT 2015, for its acronym in Spanish), female
caregivers spend 7.3 hours per day in unpaid work versus 4 for non-caregivers.
66
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contrary, income effects exceed substitution effects, informal care would increment
labor supply.

b. Spatial constraints to labor supply

If the temporal competition of paid and unpaid work determines substitution effects,
then commuting times also affect labor supply. Therefore, women facing long
commuting times present a more constrained labor supply. In economic geography, the
geographical penalization to labor market outcomes is known as spatial mismatch
effects, a theory that underscores the role of mobility and distance to work in
determining labor supply (Kain, 1968; Kain, 2004).
In Chile and elsewhere, scholars have outlined that women face additional
obstacles when moving across the urban space (Jirón, 2007; Almahmood et al., 2017).
For example, male harassment often leads women to different strategies for urban
mobility and labor market participation. Night jobs, for instance, may be out of
consideration for women who reside in dangerous neighborhoods and rely on public
transportation (Jirón, 2007). However, unpaid domestic and care labor is probably the
most limiting factor to female mobility.
First of all, public transportation is not designed to balance paid and unpaid
responsibilities, complicating the combination of these activities (Loukaitou-Sideris,
2016). Additionally, unpaid care involves the participation of dependents whose
mobility is often limited. Care work pairs place-bound and people-bound constraints. In
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other words, care needs to take place somewhere (at some time) with someone, further
complicating labor market participation. 67 68

c. Residential segregation and female labor supply

The spatial considerations for labor supply present a possible source of endogeneity in
balancing paid and unpaid work. If people can self-select (a-la-Tiebout)69 into regions
were employment opportunities are widely available, then spatial and temporal
constraints may not be a significant factor in determining the labor supply.
Consequently, determining the exogeneity of residential location on employment
decisions is a considerable challenge for spatial mismatch research (Hellerstein et al.,
2008).
More often than not, however, residential segregation is the product of
exogenous political and economic events that penalize the urban poor’s locational
capabilities (Nightingale, 2012, Rothstein, 2017). Extensive research has unveiled the
political events that have led Chilean cities to become some of the most economically
segregated in Latin America (Sabatini, 2000; Hidalgo, 2007; Sabatini and Brain, 2008;
This is known as a coupling constraint (Hägerstrand, 1970) and is one of caregivers’ most restrictive
factors to mobility (Kwan, 2000; Ta et al., 2016).
67

In terms of female labor supply, gendered mobility entails that substitution effects will grow faster for
women than for men. Moreover, if we consider coupling constraints, substitution effects will likely grow
the fastest for caregivers. Assuming that income effects will not drastically vary with distance, growing
substitution effects entail that female labor supply will become less elastic with commuting distance and,
eventually, negatively sloped until the point of not entering or dropping out of the labor force.
68

In 1956, Charles Tiebout developed a theory of public goods where urban residents were able to locate
their households according to their public goods preferences (Tiebout 1956).
69
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Agostini et al., 2016; Garreton, 2017; Garreton et al., 2020). In my work, I have provided
evidence for the inability of less-educated female caregivers to locate their households
in regions with high availability of employment opportunities in Santiago, the country’s
capital and most populous city (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I).
Regularly, the economic segregation of urban space coincides with the sorting of
the city across educational levels (Diamond 2016). The attractiveness of urban amenities
attracts more educated and affluent households to particular sections of a city,
increasing housing prices and effectively displacing or excluding lower income people
from these regions. These areas, moreover, tend to be around the economic centers of
the city, where employment opportunities are more widely available (Garcia Dellacasa,
2021, Ch. I).
Considering gendered mobility constraints, the sorting of urban spaces across
educational levels further penalizes female labor market participation, especially for
less-educated caregivers. This entails additional considerations for inclusive
development strategies. In order to be successful, policies seeking to increase female
labor market participation and reduce economic inequalities must seriously consider the
locational characteristics of job creation.

IV.

A simple model

I use a leisure-consumption-caring model to analyze the economic implications of the
CCA program. In order to contextualize the CCA in Chilean cities, the model considers
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exogenous household location and gendered expectations. Moreover, in this initial
setup, the model assumes that women and men residing with dependents make
decisions independently. This is a strong assumption. After all, families do coordinate
their division of work. I relax this assumption in a later section.
The model’s initial setup bridges two bodies of theoretical literature. It considers
both the temporal constraints of care and residential segregation for defining labor
supply. The caring aspects of the model reflect the works of Carmichael and Charles
(1998) and Fevang, Kverndokk, and Roed (2009). Similarly to these models, we assume
that men and women have altruistic preferences for family dependents. However, we
also consider that women can internalize social expectations that associate femininity
with caregiving (i.e., gender norms).
Gender norms have sustained, and have been reinforced by, several centuries of
patriarchal rule (Folbre, 2021). Scholars have observed that even when women enter
the labor force, they take on the lion’s share of domestic care responsibilities to live up
to social expectations (Bittman et al., 2003; Beneria, 2010). Social narratives of ‘good
working mothers’—women who balance paid and unpaid responsibilities—have become
increasingly prevalent (Duberley and Carrigan, 2016). On the other hand, ‘Good working
fathers’ narratives are much less present in the social imaginary (Ranson, 2012). Chile’s
low female labor market participation in lower-income households, moreover, has been
associated with prevalent gender norms (Contreras & Plaza, 2010).
Regarding adult care, gender norms are perhaps the clearest in households where
dependents reside with single non-dependent adults (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021; Ch. II). The
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likelihood of adult dependents residing with single women or single men is similar. In
2017, around 22% of dependents lived with single women and 22% with single men.
Nevertheless, single women provide care at a significantly higher rate than single men.
Almost 72% of dependents residing with single women receive care from them. On the
other hand, less than 57% of dependents living with single men receive care from their
family members.
Previous works theorizing spatial effects on labor supply have focused on mobility
constraints (Gutierrez-i-Puigarnau and van Ommeren, 2010). The model presented here
integrates residential segregation in this form. As mentioned earlier, residential
segregation is associated with a spatial mismatch between home and job place. The
regions that host lower-income segregated communities are often economically
depressed and, therefore, lack employment opportunities. Hence, people in segregated
communities are less likely to be employed locally and travel longer distances to find
employment. The effects of residential segregation on mobility constraints can be
operationalized through the relationship between job density and commuting time.
Job density is the relative availability of employment places to working-age
residents in a given locality. Following Garcia Dellacasa (2021, Ch. I), this model assumes
that local job density is exogenous to labor supply decisions. The 2012 Origin
Destination Survey for the greater Santiago region shows the relationship between job
density and commuting time. Defining job density similarly to Garcia Dellacasa (2021,
Ch. I), Table 14 summarizes this linear relationship for less-educated full-time workers
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on a typical workday. 70 The dependent variable is the ratio of commuting time over
total hours spent at the job place (i.e., the commuting share). 71 Table 14 shows that a
unit of job density decreases the commuting share by over 5% for public transportation
users.

Table 14: OLS regression for less-educated workers in a typical day using 2012 ODS.

a. The basic setup: Utility maximization under gendered expectations

Considering gender norms; and decision-making as independent from other nondependent adults; our model assumes that non-dependent women and men residing
with dependents maximize the following utility function:

70

Less educated workers are those that at most hold a high school degree.

According to the ODS, the commuting share is 25.7% for workers using public transportation and 15.1%
for people who travel using private means of transportation.
71
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Where X represents the bundle of goods and services consumed by the individual and
bought in the market, and L illustrates the number of hours spent on leisure activities.
Following Fevang et al. (2009), A denotes an altruistic function informed by the
dependent’s wellbeing (N), and β is the individual valuation of the dependent’s care
status (β > 0). Hence, A is positively correlated with N. S, on the other hand, is a function
denoting the gendered expectations to provide care. Its negative coefficient is
interpreted here as a psychological penalty for not meeting gendered expectations.
Therefore, as dependents have their needs met, the gendered penalty decreases. In
other words, S is inversely related to total care received by the dependent (N). γ is its
respective discount factor (γ > 0).
The dependent’s wellbeing is assumed to depend entirely on total care received,
such that:

Where 𝑍𝑍 is the total amount of informal care received from household members and 𝑍𝑍̅
is the total hours of care received from out-of-household individuals. η is a discount
factor associated with the degree of trust in out-of-household care (0 < 𝜂𝜂 < 1). As

mentioned above, people may be less trusting in non-familiar individuals. Therefore, the
dependent’s psychological wellbeing is assumed to improve less from one hour of
outside care than one hour of in-home care. Replacing (2) in (3), non-dependents
maximize the following utility functions:
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Additionally, we make the following assumptions:

b. Spatio-temporal budget constraint: Introducing residential segregation as
an income penalty

In leisure-consumption models, individual consumption is constrained by their budget
and time. Here, we add a spatial element (disguised as a temporal one) to individual
constraints. Our model includes job density’s effect over commuting shares as a
constraint to labor supply. Considering the commuting share, we define total time
available (T) as being made up of:

Where LS is the total labor supply, and t(j) is the commuting share, which is negatively
correlated with job density (j). On the other hand, after normalizing commodity prices
(P=1), the individual’s budget constraint can be defined as:
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Where 𝑌𝑌� is the non-labor income and 𝑤𝑤 represents the real wage. Replacing (4) in (5),
we obtain the following spatio-temporal budget constraint:

The commuting share, hence, acts as a discount factor on wages.
In summary, individuals face the following optimization problem:

Hence, women’s optimal allocation will be determined by:
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And men’s:

The first- and second-order conditions for the female caregivers’ optimization problem
are in Section 1.1 in the Appendix. Men’s optimization is the same, with the difference
being
𝛾𝛾 = 0. Hence, any gendered difference in individual maximization can be evaluated by

how maximization equilibria change with respect to 𝛾𝛾. If, in equilibrium, women’s care
provision is positively affected by 𝛾𝛾, they will provide more care than men.
V.

CCA’s effects through the lens of our model

The model presented above can help us analyze the CCA’s effects on female and male
consumption, leisure time, domestic care provision, and labor supply. The program
influences at least two variables. First of all, the communal factor in the program entails
that job density (j) will increase according to local dependency rates. Secondly, the
socialization of care from the family to the state will increase individual access to out-ofhousehold care (increase in 𝑍𝑍̅).
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a. Increasing job density effects on total consumption, leisure, care
provision, and labor supply

Under certain assumptions, an increase in job density will carry positive effects over
total consumption and leisure. No additional assumptions are necessary for capturing
job density’s negative effects over the provision of care. Section 1.2 in the Appendix
shows the calculations for obtaining the equilibrium allocation after increasing job
density. For female caregivers, job density effects are:

With:

Conversely, men’s equilibrium allocation is affected in the same way as women’s, but
with 𝛾𝛾 = 0:
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Commuting shares act as a discount factor to wages. Therefore, as is common in leisureconsumption models, an increase in perceived wages has an ambiguous effect on
consumption. However, job density effects on consumption will be negative only at high
levels of labor market participation.72 Since female caregivers present a priori low levels
of labor participation, it is unlikely that consumption will decrease with higher job
density. Men residing in low job density regions are also more likely to participate in the
informal and part-time market (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. I). Therefore, it is safe to
assume that income effects will be stronger than substitution effects and consumption
in regions where the CCA is instituted. Higher consumption signals an increase in labor
supply that arises from decreased commuting time and less time allocated to domestic
care activities. With higher job density, the opportunity cost of domestic care provision
increases and, hence, its provision decreases.
Gendered differences in job density effects depend on how the parameter 𝛾𝛾

∗⁄ )
∗ ⁄ )
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 − (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0 (due to γ > 0),
affects the equilibrium points. Since (𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤

Since leisure and caring time are low at high levels of labor market participation, Θ will be large. This
could possibly reverse job density effects.

72
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women’s provision of domestic care decreases less than men’s provision. Therefore, at
the social level, higher job density may create more significant inequalities in the
distribution of unpaid domestic care while reducing the provision of domestic care for
both men and women. Gendered expectations entail that women’s labor supply is more
inelastic than men’s to changes in job density.

b. Higher access to public care and the importance of trust

Following Section 1.3 in the Appendix, we find that:

These results underscore the importance of trust for determining the economic impact
of the CCA. When trust in out-of-household care is high, female and male caregivers will
be more willing to change caring hours for leisure and paid labor. Notice, moreover, that
gendered expectations do not affect these results. We would observe gendered
differences only if trust levels are different for men and women.
The economic performance of the CCA program depends on its ability to get
people to trust it. The fact that the Care Aides will be a part of the dependent’s
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community facilitates trust. However, this may not be enough. For this reason,
allocating resources to trust-building and allowing local organizations to be a part of the
planning process is of utmost importance.

VI.

Alternative policies for economic reactivation and care provision

The CCA is an ambitious program. For this reason, it is necessary to evaluate it against
the backdrop of other proposals that have similar goals. Here we have chosen two
policies proposed in the current election year: a universal basic income (UBI) and paying
domestic caregivers. The UBI’s main objective is to reactivate the economy through a
push in aggregate demand while paying domestic caregivers has been framed in the
context of addressing patriarchal exploitation of female labor. Here, we evaluate these
policies through the model presented above.

a. Universal Basic Income
The profound economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has led congress and other
politicians to consider implementing a UBI. 73 74 As of late, at least one presidential
campaign has included a UBI that ensures a poverty line transfer as a part of their

https://www.elmostrador.cl/destacado/2020/06/16/renta-basica-de-emergencia-para-chile-urgente-ynecesaria/
73
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https://www.t13.cl/noticia/politica/renta-basica-universal-emergencia-detalle-propuesta-12-05-2021
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platform.75 Supporters of the UBI claim that it is an effective tool for boosting aggregate
demand and economic reactivation. 76 77 UBI’s effects on the distribution of unpaid work
is absent from their discourse.
In our model, the UBI can is an increase in every individual’s non-labor income
(𝑌𝑌�). Following Section 1.4 in the Appendix, we find that female caregiver’s response to
the UBI is:

As expected, the UBI increases total consumption. Moreover, it bears no consequences
over the provision and distribution of care. Therefore, an increment in leisure time
entails that hours of labor supply will be crowded out of the market. Gendered
expectations have no impact over UBI’s effects.

b. Paying domestic caretakers

https://boricpresidente.cl/programa/
https://www.latercera.com/opinion/noticia/mas-alla-de-la-emergencia-pensar-una-renta-basicauniversal-como-politica-permanente/F5Q2TYSYSBBDDHFVAXR2PNCEQA/
75
76

https://www.cnnchile.com/pais/renta-basica-de-600-mil-la-propuesta-de-la-oposicion-para-la-agendade-minimos-comunes_20210512/
77
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Another idea that has come up during this election year combines the CCA and the UBI.
At least one presidential candidate has proposed to pay 75% of the monthly minimum
wage to domestic caregivers in low-income households (poorest 40%). 78 The candidate
and his allies have argued that this would be an effective policy “towards ending the
patriarchal society.” 79 However, the mechanisms through which this would happen are
unclear.
To analyze this policy through the lens of our model, we need to slightly tweak
budget constraints to:

Where 𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐 is the transfer associated with one hour of domestic care.

The effects of this program on women’s total consumption, leisure, and caring

time are:
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https://www.danieljaduepresidente.cl/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/PROGRAMA.pdf

https://www.radionuevomundo.cl/2021/06/08/maria-e-puelma-propuesta-de-jadue-que-buscaremunerar-el-trabajo-domestico-de-la-mujer-es-un-avance-hacia-el-fin-de-una-sociedad-excluyente-ypatriarcal/
79
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The effects on consumption and leisure depend on the relationship between the value
of the domestic care transfer and the discounted wage rate. If 𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐 > 𝑤𝑤�1 + 𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗), total

consumption and leisure time will increase with the program. Moreover, the effect on
care provision also depends on the discounted wage rate. Although always positive, the
lower the discounted wage rate, the higher the provision of care. Hence, paying for
domestic caregiving may entail very different effects for lower-income and wealthy
individuals. Lower-income people living in segregated communities face lower
discounted wage rates. Therefore, they will increase their consumption by allocating
more time to caregiving. They will also increase their leisure time. Hence, their labor
supply will decrease. The effects of the program on wealthy individual’s labor supply, on
the other hand, is undetermined. The effect of paying domestic caregivers over labor
supply marks a significant departure from paying community caregiving through the
CCA.
These effects are also gendered. Due to gendered expectations, it is likely that
∗
∗ 80
𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤
> 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚
. Moreover,

∗⁄
∗ ⁄
𝜕𝜕(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐 )
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐 )
�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 0 and 𝜕𝜕(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤
�𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 > 0, meaning that

women’s consumption and leisure time will increase at a higher rate (or decrease at a
lower rate) than men’s. Since

∗⁄
𝜕𝜕(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑤𝑤
𝑑𝑑𝑌𝑌 𝑐𝑐 )�
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 < 0, men will increase their provision of

care at a higher rate than women. The program would increase the household provision
of domestic care and equalize the social provision of care between men and women.

∗
Unless both men and women reach a ceiling of care provision. For example, if 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤∗ > 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚
> 𝑇𝑇, then men
and women would provide the same amount of care.
80
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VII.

Comparing policies using a parametric model

We use a simplified parametric version of the model to compare the economic effects of
the CCA, UBI, and paying domestic caregivers. The simulations only consider a segment
of the population. Namely, non-dependent adults who reside with dependent adults.
Additionally, the comparative analysis considers two aspects of each program for this
subset of the population: their effects on economic growth (aggregate demand and
aggregate supply) and their effects on economic inequality (average-income households
versus high-income households and gender inequalities). We also analyze the effects of
each program on the distribution of domestic care. The parameters of the model were
chosen according to available baseline data.
Non-dependent women’s optimization process is:

Men maximize the same function with 𝛾𝛾 = 0. In this parametric model, 𝐴𝐴(𝑁𝑁) =

−𝑆𝑆(𝑁𝑁) = 𝑁𝑁 𝜅𝜅 . The model maintains the properties of the theoretical model presented

above. Initially, we assume that there is no source of out-of-home care. Therefore, 𝑁𝑁 =
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𝑍𝑍. For simplicity, we assume 𝛼𝛼 = 𝜅𝜅 = 0.5. Real wages (𝑤𝑤) were set according to the
2017 Family Budgets Survey (FBS), the most comprehensive income and spending
survey in Chile.81 Since we normalized prices before, we must do the same in our
baseline model. Thus, we define real wages as the ratio between average income over
average spending. According to the FBS, the average ratio between income and
spending is 1.04. Hence, we define real wages at that level. The average commuting
share (𝑡𝑡(𝑗𝑗)), as per the 2012 ODS, is 25%. Additionally, according to the 2015 National
Time Use Survey82 the average time spent in care by women residing with dependents is
3.27 hours while men spend 1.73 hours in active care. β and γ were adjusted accordingly
to 𝛽𝛽 = 1.2 and 𝛾𝛾 = 0.45.

This model is solved in Section 2.1 of the Appendix, giving the following

equilibrium allocation for women and men, respectively:

a. Caveats in simulation analysis

Before analyzing the economic potential of each program, we must address some
caveats in the simulation exercise. First of all, the implementation of these programs will
likely require tax reform. Although taxes may affect aggregate demand, the model
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https://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/sociales/ingresos-y-gastos/encuesta-de-presupuestos-familiares
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https://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/sociales/genero/uso-del-tiempo
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presented above does not consider them. The analysis, therefore, assumes a postreform scenario, where taxes are a sunk cost. This scenario is not unlikely. Most
candidates, including the more economically conservative ones, have proposed to
increase tax collection. The proposals range from increasing the tax collection by 3% 83 of
GDP to 11%. 84
The second caveat is that the programs’ economic effects are only examined for
the subpopulation of non-dependent adults living with dependent adults. However, CCA
and UBI entail effects for additional fractions of the population. Job density effects
associated with CCA, for instance, may also benefit the non-dependent population who
does not live with any dependents. The universal nature of the UBI implies that every
adult receives a stipend, irrespective of their family structure. Paying domestic
caregivers, on the other hand, only targets non-dependent adults living with dependent
adults. Hence, for comparative purposes, the analysis is reduced to this maximum
common denominator.
Finally, in our model, men and women allocate their labor independently from
each other. Given the current distribution of dependents’ family structures, this is not a
horrible assumption. 44% of dependents live with a single non-dependent adult, and
less than 30% reside with at least one non-dependent woman and one non-dependent
man (Garcia Dellacasa, 2021, Ch. II). Nevertheless, in a later section, we present a

https://www.sumamosxsichel.cl/2021/05/15/propuesta-de-reforma-tributaria-de-sebastian-sichelincluye-devolucion-de-iva-a-familias/
83

84

https://www.danieljaduepresidente.cl/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/PROGRAMA.pdf
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theoretical extension to our model analyzing the effects of the CCA in households with
at least one woman and one man.

b. Economic reactivation and cost analysis

We measure the effectiveness of these policies for reactivating the economy in contrast
to their estimated implementation costs. We use the 2017 CASEN survey, Chile’s most
comprehensive socioeconomic survey, 85 to make some back-of-the-envelope
estimations for the policies’ cost. These estimations do not consider implementation,
administrative, or any other form of transaction costs.
The CCA gross cost is calculated by imputing the sliding-scale payment presented
in Section II to adult dependents’ unpaid caregivers in the 2017 CASEN. The CCA’s
estimated cost is 0.756% of GDP.86 The UBI cost is calculated through a simple
imputation of the poverty line income to every adult (18+) in a family with at least one
dependent adult, making it 0.139% of GDP. Finally, the proposal to pay domestic
caregivers is unclear on how many caregivers there might be in a household. However, if
we impose a limit of one caregiver per household, the cost of paying 75% of the
minimum wage to every unpaid caregiver is 0.789% of GDP.

85

http://observatorio.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl/encuesta-casen

We assume that the nearly 600,000 unpaid caregivers are enough to provide coverage for the entire
dependent population (nearly a million). Almost the entirety of the moderate and severely dependent
population receives care from family members. Hence, their unpaid caregivers are allocated one and oneand-a-half monthly minimum wages, respectively. The rest of unpaid caregivers are assumed to be
sporadic workers.
86
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We consider two factors to measure the effectiveness of these policies on
boosting the economy. On the one hand, we calculate the effects on total consumption
(aggregate demand) for non-dependents residing with dependents. Secondly, to assess
if these policies may lead to inflationary pressures, we also calculate the effects on their
labor supply (aggregate supply). 87 We know from equation 8 that CCAs impact on total
consumption and labor supply depend on the degree of trust families have in out-ofhousehold care provision. Therefore, we will consider three different scenarios to
measure the impact of the CCA program: a low-trust scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.3), a medium-trust
scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.5) and a high-trust scenario (𝜂𝜂 = 0.7).

i. Total consumption and aggregate demand in the examined
subpopulation

Table 15 summarizes the effects of each program on total consumption for nondependent adults residing with dependents. The last column in Table 15 shows the
spending efficacy of each program in increasing total consumption. The Table shows
that the CCA is the program that carries the most significant impact on total
consumption. 88 However, its effectiveness depends on at least two variables. First of all,
trust in the program is crucial. The more people trust in the program, the more likely

87

The analysis for each program can be found in the Mathematical Appendix, Section 2.

88

We have assumed that the CCA program offers six hours of care a day.
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they will trade hours of unpaid care for hours of paid labor. Therefore, aggregate
demand effects are significantly dependent on trust levels.
The second factor to consider is if there are minimum floors to the provision of
care. CCAs may not be able to meet all caring needs. For instance, some dependents
may need assistance in the middle of the night when CCAs will not be available to
provide it. This would mean that the minimum floors for reducing the domestic care
provision could be higher than zero. For simplicity, in this model, we have considered
the floor to be zero. Due to gendered expectations, men reach that floor faster than
women, and total consumption increments reach its ceiling at 12.48%. However, the
higher the minimum floor for the provision of unpaid domestic care, the lower the
program’s effect on economic growth.

Table 15: Policy effects on total consumption percentage point change.

Another attractive characteristic of the CCA program is that even when
economic reactivation is not its primary objective and trust in the program is low, it
performs similarly to the UBI. When trust is higher, the CCA outperforms the UBI. Paying
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domestic caregivers is, by far, the less profitable program. The reason behind this very
mild increase is an extreme crowding-out from the paid labor market into the newly
paid domestic caregiving sector. Here, we have assumed a ceiling on the provision of
domestic care to six hours. Since the pay is lower than the discounted wage rate, the
effects on total consumption are positive but low. Men actually decrease their total
consumption.

ii. Effects on labor supply and inflationary pressures

After the current economic crisis, it is unlikely that people will continue to step out of
the labor force. Therefore, crowding-out effects are improbable in the short term. As
the economy stabilizes, however, their likelihood becomes higher and inflationary
pressures may arise. Table 16 shows significant differences between the programs’
effects on labor supply.

Table 16: Policy effects on percentage point change in labor supply hours.
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The CCA is the only program that increases the labor supply. Therefore, it is best suited
to generate real impacts on the economy as it minimizes the likelihood of inflationary
pressures. Paying domestic caregivers, on the other hand, generates the highest
contraction in aggregate supply.

c. Economic and gender inequality

We can analyze two sources of economic inequality through our model: i) wage
inequalities in the labor market and ii) territorial inequalities emerging from differences
in job density. Additionally, we can analyze the policy effects in within- and between
gender-inequality. 89
Here we consider high-earning individuals to earn double the average wage rate.
According to our model, and assuming equal job density between households, average
wage earners consume 45.8% of high-earners consumption. This ratio assumes equal
job density. If we assume that job density is higher in high-income neighborhoods, then
inequality in consumption would be even more significant. 90

i. Policy effects over consumption inequalities:

In Section 2.1.1 in the Mathematical Appendix we find the base allocation for women and men who
perceive wages at double the average rate.
89

90

This means that unpaid care deepens inequalities in consumption.
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Table 17 shows the change in the consumption ratio between average earners and highearners. Here, we can see that the CCA and the UBI policy can decrease inequality in
consumption. The CCA’s effectiveness once again depends on the level of trust in the
program. Inequality reduction will go hand-in-hand with trust levels. Paying domestic
caregivers, on the other hand, may produce the opposite result. This is because
wealthier households are less likely to trade paid labor market hours for paid domestic
hours. In fact, as we can see in Section 2.4.1 in the Mathematical Appendix, the increase
in domestic care hours for high-earners is minimal.

Table 17: Policy effects on percentage point change of the ratio between average consumption and high-earners
consumption. A positive value indicates that the after-policy ratio is higher, meaning that the gaps in consumption
have decreased.

ii. Territorial considerations for the CCA’s inequality effects

CCA’s effects on consumption depend on how much the program can reduce domestic
care provision and increase job density. If job creation is proportional to total
dependents, then increments in job density will be proportional to dependency rates.
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Therefore, residents in places with higher dependency rates (the ratio of dependents to
adults) will benefit more from the program.
Poorer municipalities are, on average, less job dense than wealthier
municipalities (Garcia Dellacasa 2021, Ch. I). Table 18 shows the linear relationship
between dependency rates (for adults and children) and average municipal income. We
find that adult dependency rates are higher in lower-income municipalities, while there
is no significant relationship for child dependency rates. This correlation indicates that
lower-income jurisdictions will benefit more from the CCA than higher-income
jurisdictions, further reducing territorial inequality.

Table 18: OLS regression for dependency on average municipal income using the 2017 Casen.

iii. Gender inequalities in consumption

Given gendered expectations, men and women react differently to public policy. Hence,
these policies will affect gender inequalities in consumption. Keeping in mind that
inequality effects were calculates as if men and women allocate their labor
independently of each other, columns three and four in Table 19 summarize the
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percentage point change in the ratio of total consumption for men and women
(between-gender inequality). The ratio is defined as women’s consumption over men’s
consumption. The results show that, in average income households, the higher the trust
in the CCA program, the higher the ratio of total consumption. Thus, between-gender
inequality would decrease. In high-income households, given that the program is less
effective in decreasing hours of unpaid care, trust does not affect consumption
inequality.
Table 19: Policy effects on percentage point change in female to male consumption ratio. A positive value indicates
that gaps in consumption are lowered.

Trust will affect within-gender inequality as well. Higher trust in the CCA will lead
to lower consumption inequality between women of different economic backgrounds.
Paying domestic caregivers will strongly reduce between-gender inequality in average
income households. However, this is paired with an increase in men’s within-inequality
ratio, signaling that higher equality in average income households may not necessarily
signal better material conditions for all homes.

iv. The distribution of domestic care work
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Gendered expectations lead women to provide the lion’s share of domestic work.
Moreover, Chile’s familial care system relies excessively on household members to
provide care for adult dependents. According to our baseline data, female-led
households provide 3.27 hours of domestic care, and male-led homes provide 1.73
hours. This means that women provide 65.4% of total domestic care.91 The programs
have very distinct effects on the distribution of unpaid care. The CCA socializes care to
communities and the state, decreasing the load of domestic care. The UBI bears no
effects on the distribution of care. Moreover, paying domestic caregivers increments the
reliance of dependents on domestic care.
Table 20 summarizes the effects on the total provision of unpaid care and the
female share of domestic care provision:

Table 20: Policy effects on the provision of domestic care.

This estimate is pretty close to the gender distribution of unpaid caregivers for adult dependents.
According to the 2017 CASEN, 67.8% of unpaid caregivers are women.
91
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The Table shows that paying domestic caregivers may be the best equalizer in the
distribution of domestic work. It does so, however, by severely increasing the supply of
domestic care. On the other hand, the CCA reduces the reliance on domestic care, but it
makes its gender distribution more skewed at medium and low levels of trust. 92

VIII.

Allocation in families: A theoretical extension

Thus far, we have considered that men and women residing with dependents maximize
their utility independent from each other. Although smaller households are becoming
increasingly common, nearly 30% of adult dependents still reside in extended families.93
In these households, family decision-making processes influence individual allocation.
Traditional neoclassical models of the family assume the household as a singlemaximizing unit (Becker, 1985). Feminist economists have disputed this amicable
perspective of the family, arguing that conflict and bargaining processes are crucial to
family decision-making (Folbre, 2012; Beneria et al., 2015 Political, economic, and
cultural factors inform bargaining power. However, fallback positions, or exit threats,
have been syndicated as a crucial component (Chant and McIlwaine 2016, p.79; Folbre,

92

It must be noted that the extreme change in distribution for the CCA program is due to our assumption
of a zero-care floor. If people were to reduce their care to a fixed positive number of hours of care, the
distribution would be less skewed (and the program would also be less effective in stimulating
consumption).

93

According to 2017 CASEN. See Garcia Dellacasa 2021, Ch. II.
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2021). 94 Exit threats refer to the individual’s resource allocation in case they were to exit
the family relationship. This theoretical extension discusses how policies may affect the
family decision-making process through changes in exit threats through a non—
cooperative Cournot-Nash equilibrium analysis (Chen and Woolley, 2001).
The first thing to note is that the individual maximization presented above is the
de-facto exit threat for men and women, i.e., how much care they would provide if they
exited the relationship. If there are no barriers to exit, men and women can leave the
relationship and allocate their time according to the individual maximization model.
However, men and women may use their bargaining power to negotiate non-exit
outcomes. The bargaining position, conversely, will depend on the degree of
interdependence between the two parties.
We can slightly tweak our model to integrate interdependency into our model.
Following a similar structure to equation 2, let us assume that in a heterosexual
traditional extended family, the total provision of care is determined by:

𝑁𝑁𝑤𝑤 is the total provision of care perceived by non-dependent women, and 𝑁𝑁𝑚𝑚 is the
total provision of care perceived by non-dependent men. Note that the role of care

provisioning in individual maximization has a slightly different interpretation. Now it is
interpreted from the perspective of the caregiver. Furthermore, we assume that both

Bargaining power is a complex social construct conditioned by Institutional, political, cultural, and social
institutions (Elson 1999).
94
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men and women value their personal provisioning of care at the highest (unitary) rate.
However, due to gendered expectations, we will assume that women’s trust in male
care is lower than men’s trust in female care (𝛿𝛿 < 1). 95

Assuming a non-cooperative Cournot equilibrium, any change in exogenous

factors is evaluated against the backdrop of the partner’s respective reaction function.
From equation 8 we know that:

Therefore, the reaction functions can be written and rearranged as:

Where 𝑍𝑍 𝑁𝑁 is the Nash equilibrium care provision. Equation 17 tells us that whenever

men’s exit provision is equal or greater than women’s, male care will be equal to zero
(or whatever the floor provision is). Additionally, if there are barriers to exiting the

95

Possibly a result of social conditioning.
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relationship, and women’s exit provision is higher than men’s, female provision of care
may be higher than the value of the exit provision. Finally, the magnitude of women’s
care provision (and, hence, their labor supply) depends on the difference between
feminine and masculine exit strategies. Since men’s care provision is zero, women
provide exit-threat level care, and a sexual division of labor emerges.
Due to gendered expectations, women’s provision of care when exiting the
relationship is always equal or higher than that of men for the policies analyzed above.
Even though the CCA policy would increase female labor supply at a higher rate (the
difference between exit strategies is less), it would still lead to a skewed distribution of
domestic care. 96 There is, however, a theoretical possibility for the CCA to distribute
domestic care work more equitably. To see this, we need to remember that the exit
strategy is conditional on job density. When job density is higher, the exit provision of
care decreases.
Thus far, we have assumed that men and women face similar job densities.
However, gendered occupational segregation in the labor market may entail different
local job densities for men and women in the same household (Garcia Dellacasa 2021,
Ch. I). If the CCA were to create jobs at a higher proportion for women than for men,
women’s exit strategies would decrease faster. If female job density increases

Furthermore, in contrast to the individual maximization process, paying domestic caregivers would
most likely result in the most skewed distribution of all under the strategic allocation. If we assume 𝛿𝛿=0.5
in our simplified model, the non-cooperative outcome would be for women to provide six hours of care
and men to provide zero.
96
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sufficiently, a balanced distribution of care becomes a credible threat. Figure 16
illustrates this argument:

Figure 16: Cournot-Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently high increase in female job density.

At an initial stage, men’s a women’s reaction functions do not cross. The Nash
∗
equilibrium at this level is a sexual division of labor where women provide 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤
and men
∗
provide 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚
= 0 However, a sufficiently high increment in female job density contracts

women’s reaction function inwards. Now an internal solution is possible. Women can
𝑁𝑁
𝑁𝑁
credibly threaten to provide 𝑍𝑍𝑤𝑤
, at which point men provide 𝑍𝑍𝑚𝑚
> 0. Even in the
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presence of gendered expectations, women’s improvement in their fallback position
may trigger a negotiation and a more just distribution of unpaid work. It is also worth
noticing that if the changes in job density are too small, the sexual division will persist
(no internal solution).
Since families do cooperate, a non-cooperative equilibrium is unlikely. However,
this equilibrium replaces the exit strategy as a credible threat of non-cooperation (Chen
and Woolley 2001). Job density, therefore, may induce a bargaining process that does
not necessarily rely on the threat of or barriers to exiting the relationship.
This theoretical possibility also raises a possible moral conundrum for the CCA
program. A gendered distribution of paid community care may lead to greater equality
in the gender distribution of unpaid domestic care. It is not in the scope of this paper to
discuss the implications of this trade-off, but it is important to acknowledge its
theoretical feasibility.

IX.

Final remarks

The CCA program is an ambitious idea to transform Chile’s care system. The program is
expected to the coverage and quality of adult care even as it improves the working
conditions of caregivers. Moreover, the program’s also entails economic benefits arising
from increasing job density in economically depressed regions and decreasing unpaid
work hours for caregivers, especially women. This article provides theoretical evidence
for the mechanisms behind the program’s economic impacts.
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The CCA applies one of the oldest premises in the economics discipline. The
community aspect of the program allows for a division of labor which is challenging if
not impossible for households, especially for smaller ones. By expanding the limits of
the division of labor, the CCA introduces efficiency to care provision, liberating
thousands of unpaid hours of work. Additionally, the CCA targets the more temporally
and spatially constrained communities, driving economic growth through inequality
reduction.
The model presented in this article shows that decreasing unpaid care work will
increase total consumption and labor supply, especially for women. Therefore, the
CCA’s simultaneous effects on aggregate demand and aggregate supply boost real
economic growth without generating inflationary pressures often associated with high
fiscal spending. Furthermore, given that the program will disproportionately benefit
regions with high dependency rates, the CCA will decrease inequality between low- and
high-income households and gender inequalities.
Within the assumptions of this model, the CCA program outperforms the UBI and
paying domestic caregivers as an economic policy. However, the economic performance
of the CCA is contingent upon people’s trust in community caregiving. The significance
of trust calls for planning and implementation methods that seriously consider local
needs. Therefore, state authorities need to collaborate with local organizations
throughout the process of transforming Chile’s system of care.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 1
A.1 Comparison between ODS and 2012 census
Defining low-skilled potential workers as those who, at most, hold a high school degree,
I compare the representativity of the ODS to the 2012 census in Table A-1. The table
indicates that the weighted observations from the ODS dataset and the population
parameters are similar in magnitude.
Table A-1: Summary of basic labor statistics comparing ODS 2012 and the 2012 Census. Calculations using survey
weights. The working-age is between 15 and 65 years of age for the greater Santiago area.

A.2 Moran’s I
Moran’s I is expressed as:

𝑁𝑁
∑𝑁𝑁
�)(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗 − 𝑦𝑦�)
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𝑖𝑖=1 ∑𝑗𝑗=1 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦
𝐼𝐼 = 𝑁𝑁
∑𝑖𝑖=1 ∑𝑁𝑁
∑𝑁𝑁
�)2
𝑖𝑖=1(𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝑦𝑦
𝑗𝑗=1 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗

Where 𝑁𝑁 is equal to the number of observations, 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 is the matrix which represents the
degree of influence between observation i and observation j (usually known as the
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‘distance weight matrix’), and 𝑦𝑦 is the outcome or variable for which spatial correlation
is tested. The numerator represents the covariance between observations and their
neighbors, while the denominator is the global variance. The outcome is thus a
normalized outcome, which takes the value of -1 when the data is negatively perfectly
clustered, 1 when it is positively perfectly clustered and 0 when it is dispersed or
random.
This indicator, especially when it comes to social and economic analysis, is not
free from assumptions. A distance weight matrix defines the relationship between
neighbors. However, how do we quantify this relationship? There are several ways in
which one can specify this matrix (Gibbons, Overman and Patacchini 2015, p. 128-131),
which often depends on the nature of the dataset. In the simplest of cases, a region that
shares its borders with four other regions would have a matrix that allocated a weight of
¼ to each of the bordering regions. Thus, in this case, the assumption would be that all
of the bordering regions have the same degree of influence over the region of interest.
Regions that do not share a border, on the other hand, have no influence over each
other.
Observations in the ODS are identified at the household level. This allows us for a
more refined definition for spatial autocorrelation. Assuming that closer neighbors are
more likely to experience similar alternatives to outsource care, the distance weight
matrix is constructed according to an inverse distance weight structure. This means that
neighbors that are closer are assigned larger weights than those who reside further
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away. Moreover, I have limited the definition of neighbor to the 50 closest neighbors at
less than 1000 meters from the household coordinates.

A.3 Technical explanation for local boundaries

Our definition of locality is the point where people are indifferent between
walking (or cycling) and taking a motorized form of transportation. Beyond this point,
people are more willing to assume greater accounting costs in order to reach their
destinations. This definition is particularly relevant in the Chilean case, where the cost of
transportation is particularly high for low-income residents. In fact, according to the
2017 Family Budget Survey 97, out-of-pocket spending in transportation is only lower to
expenditures in food and non-alcoholic drinks. Moreover, a subway fare hike of CLP$30
(US$0.05) in 2019 resulted in a social crisis which eventually led to a process of
constitutional transformation.
The 2012 ODS recorded over 113,000 trips for that year. However, not all people
face similar commuting costs. Chilean students’ public transportation use is heavily
subsidized by the state. For 2012, the bus fares costed $590 (CLP) for non-student users
and $190 for students. Similarly, people over 65 years of age are beneficiaries of a
subway subsidy. There are also individuals who face higher constrains to non-motorized

https://www.ine.cl/estadisticas/sociales/ingresos-y-gastos/encuesta-de-presupuestosfamiliares
97
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mobility. People with disabilities may be indifferent between non-motorized travel and
motorized travel at a much lower distance. Thus, to obtain the point of indifference we
consider only adults between 18 and 65 years of age who are not enrolled in an
educational institution and are not physically constrained by disability. For this subgroup, the ODS recorded 70,627 trips using motorized or non-motorized modes of
transportation.
We define the indifference point as that one where the probabilities of using
motorized transportation is equal to that of walking or cycling. Figure A-1 summarizes
the trips recorded in the ODS using survey weights and bins all trips according to the
Euclidean distance between origin and destination in 100-meter intervals. On the left
panel we can see that short trips are much more common than longer trips. However,
the variable of interest is in the right panel. At what distance are people indifferent
between motorized and non-motorized transportation? On average, this seems to take
place at the 1,000-meter difference between origin and destination of trip. At this point
51% of trips are non-motorized. Moreover, the steepest declines in non-motorized
modes of transportation are between 900 and 1,000 meters, and between 1,000 and
1,100 meters. Together, the decline in preference for non-motorized modes of
transportation amounts to 28% of total trips. Only 37% of trips between 1,000 and
1,100 meters are non-motorized. Hence, our first approximation to defining locality is a
1000-meter radius around the household.
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Figure A-17: Trips in the 2012 ODS. The left panel represents the total amount of trips categorized by one hundredmeter intervals and mode of transportation for working age adults. The right panel shows the distribution of utilized
means of transportation per every one hundred-meter interval. When non-motored travel is at 50%, individuals are
equally likely to travel through motored and non- motored means of transportation. Source: 2012 ODS.

There is, however, at least one caveat with this initial measure of locality: The
point of indifference considers both public transportation and private vehicles.
Nevertheless, there are families that do not possess private vehicles, so their choices are
split between non-motorized and public transportation (and carpooling to a lesser
extent). Nearly half of the aforementioned trips recorded by the ODS were taken by
people who do not own a private vehicle (35,784). Unsurprisingly, the point of
indifference for these travelers is higher (Figure A-2). At 1,400 meters, 49.5% of all trips
are non-motorized. 100 meters later, only 37% percent of all trips take place under this
mode of transportation. Public transportation, on the other hand, represent 53% of all
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trips at this point. In fact, the change in the percentual composition of total travel is the
second largest only to the change between 1,000 and 1,100.

Figure A-18:Trips in the 2012 ODS for individuals who do not own private vehicles. The left panel represents the total
amount of trips categorized by one hundred-meter intervals and mode of transportation for working age adults who
do not own private means of motored transportation. The right panel shows the distribution of utilized means of
transportation per every one hundred-meter interval. When non-motored travel is at 50%, individuals are equally likely
to travel through motored and non-motored means of transportation. Source: 2012 ODS.

Thus, a larger radius of 1,400 meters will be considered for households that do
not possess a vehicle. The walking-distance radius approach to defining local markets
reduces the possibility of MAUP in at least two ways. First of all, our conceptualization
of locality is directly related to the importance of local markets on employment
decisions. Secondly, no observation is near the border of their own locality. Another
important property of this definition of locality is that it allows for overlapping local
markets. The radius approach allows for two workers may compete between each other
without leaving their personal local markets even when they reside in different
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localities, a characteristic of local labor markets that has been stressed by the literature
(Manning and Petrongolo 2017).

A.4 Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA)
The local Moran can be expressed in the following manner:
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As Felkner and Townsend argue: “The statistic is a measure of the strength of the
spatial correlation of an observation with its neighbors” (2013, p. 2054). If the spatial
correlation is positive, both the observation and its neighbors are simultaneously
beneath or above the mean when it comes to mobility. If the statistic is negative, on the
other hand, the observation’s mobility and its neighbors will be intersected by the
mean. The statistic is then tested for significance against the backdrop of complete
spatial randomness. To identify spatial clusters, a conditional
randomization/permutation approach is used to obtain pseudo significance levels
(Hubert 1987 in Felkner and Townsend 2013). Through this approach these clusters can
be visualized using GIS.
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APPENDIX B
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2

B.1 Statistical differences in the determinants of being cared for between low
dependency population and average dependent population.

Table B-1 presents t-tests for the difference in coefficients for the distinct population
subsets (Low levels of dependency minus average dependency). T-tests for each
difference show that these are more significant in households that are less likely to
internalize care. Therefore, an extreme reliance in household care may result in a large
fraction of the dependent population not receiving early care.

Table B-21: T-tests comparing the family type coefficients of being cared for between low dependency individuals and
average dependents.

B.2 Machine Learning methods for predicting dependency
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In order to predict dependency, I will choose the best model emerging from six different
algorithms: Logistic regression, stepwise regression, ridge regression, lasso regression,
over-grown tree, and a random forest algorithm. Brief descriptions of each of these
algorithms can be found in Table B-2.

Table B-22: Short description of each predicting method used for the analysis of adult dependency.

Traditionally, machine learning models are evaluated according to two
alternative measurements. The ROCC curve represents the tradeoff between the true
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positive rate (also known as ‘sensitivity’) and the false positive rate (1-‘specificity’) of
our predictions 98. Ideally, a prediction would have a true positive rate of one and a false
positive rate of zero, and the ROCC curve would take the shape of an inverted ‘L’. An
alternative to the ROCC curve is the ‘Precision-Recall’ curve. In this case, we evaluate
models according to their capability to simultaneously maximize true positive rates
(same as in the ROCC curve, now labeled ‘recall’) and precision. 99 Here, the ideal model
would yield a precision and a recall equal to one, and the Precision-Recall curve would
have its vertex in the top-right corner of a one-by-one graph.
We choose according to how close they are to perfect prediction. These curves
also allow us to choose the optimal prediction threshold for dependency. Instead of
arbitrarily choosing 0.5 as the cutting point for dependency predictions, we choose the
threshold that minimizes the ROCC curve tradeoff and maximizes the Prediction-Recall
curve. In other words, the thresholds by which we obtain the points closer to the topleft and top-right corners, respectively. These are calculated through the Youden Index
(for ROCC curves) and F-1 scores (for Precision-Recall curves).
The ROCC curve and the Precision-Recall curve will most likely yield different
thresholds as optimal. How do we choose between them? The answer lies in the nature
of our classification and how affects the different. Dependency is an imbalanced

98

99

𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 =
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variable, as only 7% of the training dataset corresponds to dependents, Hence, it is likely
that false positive rates will increase very slowly (true negatives will probably be very
high). Precision, on the other hand, is unaffected by this imbalance, since it only focuses
on positive values. For this reason, when we prioritize precision for choosing the
appropriate threshold false positive rates do not shoot through the roof. Figures B-1 and
B-2 illustrates both curves and their optimal threshold points.

Figure B-19: Precision-Recall curve for different models. Optimal thresholds
that maximize F-1 scores for each model are represented with a ‘+’. The
dotted line represents a ‘chance’ prediction.

Figure B-20: ROCC curve for different models. Optimal thresholds that
maximize the Youden Index for each model are represented with a triangle.
Precision-Recall optimal thresholds are represented with a ‘+’. The dotted
line represents a ‘chance’ prediction.

Table B-3 summarizes the performance for each model in predicting dependency
on the testing data. Since precision is prioritized, we chose the model that yields the
optimal thresholds with the maximum F-1 score. In this case, it is the random forest
model. Coincidentally, when maximizing precision, the random forest model also yields
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the highest Youden-Index, signaling that it minimizes the tradeoff between true and
false positive rates. This model also maximizes the accuracy of our predictions. 100

Table B-23: Performance for each method in predicting adult dependency.

B.3 Predictors

Table B-4 summarizes the variables used to predict dependency, comparing the means
for dependents and non-dependents in the training data.

100

𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 =
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Table B-24: Variables used as dependency predictors. Statistics are for the training data.

B.4 Capturing family distributions in testing data
Figure B-3 compares the actual distribution of dependents’ family types with the
predicted distributions in the testing data (divided into 2015 testing data and 2017
testing data). Since training and testing data were chosen at random, many households
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were split between the different datasets. Therefore, it is not strange that we have an
overrepresentation of dependents living alone in the testing data. This is not something
to worry about, since family types were not utilized as a predicting variable. Moreover,
the Figure shows that the predictions accurately capture the dependents’ family
distributions. Tables B-5 and B-6 provide statistical reassurance to this visual inspection.
The Pearson Chi-squared test and the Log likelihood ratio test show that Random Forest
predictions are statistically equally distributed to the actual distribution.

Figure B-21: Comparison between the actual distribution of dependents' family types and the predicted distributions in
the testing data. For illustrative purposes, the testing data has been divided by year.
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Table B-25: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of predicted dependents in
the 2015 subset of the testing data. Survey weights were included in the calculations.

Table B-26: Goodness-of-fit tests comparing the actual distribution of dependents to that of predicted dependents in
the 2017 subset of the testing data. Survey weights were included in the calculations.
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APPENDIX C
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 3

C.1 Labor supply model for women residing with dependents under gendered
expectations
C.1.1.

First and second order conditions

In this model, women maximize the following utility function:
Uw = u(X,L) + βA(N) − γS(N)

(A-1)

subject to:
)

(A-2)

Thus, the Lagrangian equation is:
) (A-3)
First order conditions:
=0

(A-4)

=0

(A-5)
=0

(A-6)
=0

The bordered Hessian for the second order conditions would look like this:
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(A-7)

(A-8)
To find a local maximum, the second order conditions have to satisfy:
−det|H3|

<

0

and
−det|H4|

>

(A-9)
0

Solving for H3 and H4, we find:

(A-10)

with
(A-11)
If

= 0. Therefore, if this common assumption is

satisfied, second order conditions are always satisfied.
C.1.2.

Job density effects on female caregivers’ labor supply

From equations 4, 5, 6, and 7 we get the following system of equations:
=0
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(A-12)
To capture job density effects we differentiate 12 considering
dj > 0:

(A-13)
In matrix form, this can be converted to:

(A- 14)

With Θ =

0 and (T − L − Z)

.
Following the same steps, it can be shown that men’s optimization problem can be
written as101:

(A-15)
C.1.2.1. Job density effects on total consumption

101

Men’s determinant would be exactly the same to
women’s with γ=0
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Using Cramer’s rule, we know that:

(A-16)
With
(A-17)
Since au’’LL – bu’’LX = 0, we know that det|M| > 0
For det|MXj |, we can arrive at the following formulation:
(A-18)

102This

means that dX/dj > 0 when we don’t consider altruism and social penalty effects,

and job density effects on consumption decrease with higher values of β or γ. Since γ = 0
for men, men increment their consumption more at similar levels of job density than
women do.

C.1.2.2. Job density effects on leisure time

102

The sign of

will depend on the value of Θ.

Here, we assume that substitution effects are higher than income effects.
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(A-19)

(A-20)

Which gives:
0

(A-21)

Notice that in the absence of a social penalty and altruism effects, dL/dj > 0. However, as
these effects grow larger (increments in β or γ), job density effects on leisure time
become smaller (det|M| becomes larger and det|MLj| is reduced).
C.1.2.3. Job density effects on domestic caring time

(A-22)

(A-23)

Which gives:
) (A-24)
This means that:
0

(A-25)
q.e.d.
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C.1.2.4. Job density effects over labor supply
Since dX/dj is positive, and no other source of income is changed, dLS/dj > 0. The
functional form of dLS/dj > 0 can be calculated from out temporal restriction:
T = (1 + t(j))LS + L + Z

(A-26)

If we differentiate with dj > 0, we get:
(A-27)
If we replace and rearrange 27, we get:

0

(A-28)

Labor supply is more inelastic on job density for women facing social penalties than for
men.
C.1.3.

Greater public care availability and female caregivers’ labor supply

To capture the effects of public care availability we differentiate 12 considering dZ > 0:

(A-29)
In matrix form, this can be converted to:
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(A-30)

C.1.3.1. Public care effects on total consumption

(A-31)
with

(A-32)
Which gives:

0

(A-33)

Therefore:
0

(A-34)

C.1.3.2. Public care effects on total leisure time

(A-35)
with
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(A-36)
Which gives:

0

(A-37)

Therefore:
0

(A-38)

C.1.3.3. Public care effects on total domestic caring time

(A-39)
with

(A-40)
Which gives:

0

(41)

Therefore:
0
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(42)

C.1.3.4. Public care effects on labor supply
If we differentiate with dZ > 0, we get:
(A-43)
Replacing and rearranging, we get:

0
C.1.4.

(A-44)

Universal basic income effects over female caregivers’ labor supply

To capture the effects of a universal basic income policy we differentiate 12 considering
d𝑌𝑌� > 0:

(A-45)
In matrix form, this can be converted to:

(A-46)

C.1.4.1. UBI effects on total consumption

(A-47)
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with
b
(A-48)

Which gives:
0

(A-49)

Therefore:
0

(A-50)

C.1.4.2. UBI effects on total leisure time

(A-51)
with
0

0
(A-52)

Which gives:
0
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(A-53)

Therefore:
0

(A-54)

C.1.4.3. UBI effects on total domestic caring time

(A-55)
with

(A-56)
Which gives:
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑|𝑀𝑀𝑍𝑍𝑌𝑌� | = 𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢′′𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 − 𝑏𝑏𝑢𝑢′′𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 = 0

(A-57)

Therefore:
=0

(A-58)

C.1.4.4. UBI effects on labor supply
If we differentiate with d𝑌𝑌� > 0, we get:
(A-59)
Replacing and rearranging, we get:
169

0
C.1.5.

(A-60)

Paying domestic caregivers’ effects over female caregivers’ labor

supply
Now, the maximization problem is slightly different:
Uw = u(X,L) + βA(N) − γS(N)

(A-61)

subject to:
)

(A-62)

f.o.c.:

(A-63)
From which we obtain the following system of equations:
Wu’X − (1 + t(j))u’L

= 0

U’L (w − (1 + t(j))Yc) − w(βA’N – γS’N ) = 0

If we differentiate with dYc > 0:
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(A-64)

(A-65)
For Cramer’s rule the new denominator would be given by:

(A-66)
If

= 0, it can be shown that:

0

(A-67)

C.1.5.1. Paying domestic caregivers’ effects on total consumption

(A-68)
with

(A69)
Which gives:
))

If

, then:
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(A-70)

0

(A-71)

Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate.
C.1.5.2. Caring Pension effects on total leisure time
(A-72)
with

(A73)
Which gives:
))
If

(A-74)

, then:
0

(A-75)

Otherwise, the effect is indeterminate.
C.1.5.3. Caring pension effects on total domestic caring time
(A-76)
with
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(A77)
Which gives:
0

(A-78)

Therefore:
0

(A-79)

C.1.5.4. Caring pension effects on labor supply
If we differentiate with dY c > 0, we get:
(A-80)
Replacing and rearranging, we get:
0
(A-81)
If

, then:
0
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(A-82)

C.2 Comparative parametric model
C.2.1.

Base model

Women maximize the following utility function

subject to:

(A-83)

𝑈𝑈𝑤𝑤 = 𝑋𝑋 𝛼𝛼 𝐿𝐿(1−𝛼𝛼) + 𝛽𝛽𝑍𝑍 𝜅𝜅 − 𝛾𝛾(−𝑍𝑍 𝜅𝜅 )
)

(A-84)

The parameters of the model are given by: α = κ = 0.5, t(j) = 0.25, β = 1.2, γ = 0.45, w = 1.04.
The Lagrangean would then look like this:
Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)Z0.5 + λ(0.832(16 − L − Z) − X)

(A85)

f.o.c:

(A-86)
From the f.o.c., we know that:
0.832L∗ =

X∗

0.8320.5 = (β + γ)Z∗−0.5
Therefore, in equilibrium:
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(A-87)

(A-88)
Replacing L∗ and Z∗ in the budget constraint we get:
0.
(A-89)
0.
C.2.1.1. Base allocation for wages = 2w
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the
optimal allocation for women is:
64 ;

95 ;

18

;

(A-90)

87 ;

59 ;

57

;

(A-91)

And for men:

C.2.2.

Community care aides program

The program presupposes an increase in job density by 10% (a reduction in the
commuting share by 0.5%) and an increase in the provision of public care to six hours.
We will assume that dependents value out of household care at 0.3 times the rate they
value domestic provision. The new Lagrangean would be:
Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)(Z + 0.3 ∗ 6)0.5 + λ(0.835(16 − L − Z) − X)

f.o.c:
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(A-92)

(A-93)
In equilibrium:

(A-94)
Replacing L∗ and Z∗ in the budget constraint we get:
0.
(A-95)
0.
C.2.2.1. CCA allocation for wages = 2w
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the
optimal allocation for women is:
=0

;

37 ;

=8

;

(A-96)

=0

;

37 ;

=8

;

(A-97)

And for men:

C.2.3.

Universal Basic Income
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The program promises an increase in autonomous income by $CLP112,527 (in 2017).
This is equivalent to 29% of the average individual expenditure. The new Lagrangean
would be:
Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)Z0.5 + λ(0.29 + 0.832(16 − L − Z) − X)

(A98)

Replacing A-88 in the new budget constraint we obtain:
0.
(A-99)
0.
C.2.3.1. UBI allocation for wages = 2w
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the
optimal allocation for women is:
64 ;

09 ;

27

;

(A-100)

87 ;

73 ;

65

;

(A-101)

And for men:

C.2.4.

Paying domestic caregivers

The program promises to pay 75% of the minimum wage to unpaid domestic workers.
This is equivalent to 51% of average spending. We will assume that the maximum
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number of hours a person can care for is 75% of full employment maximum number of
hours is full time employment (6.8 hours) The new Lagrangean would be:

Lw = X0.5L0.5 + (β + γ)Z0.5 + λ(0.51Z + 0.832(16 − L − Z) − X)

(A-102)

f.o.c:

(A-103)
In equilibrium:

(A-104)

Replacing Z∗ and L∗:
0.
(A-105)
0.
C.2.4.1. Paying domestic caregivers, allocation for wages = 2w
Following the same steps as above it can be shown that when wages are doubled, the
optimal allocation for women is:
7 ;

33 ;
178

41 ;

(A-106)

And for men:
9 ;

79 ;
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69 ;

(A-107)
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